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PREFACE 
This research has a history of its own that precedes my 
acceptance as a researcher of the PGI programme. My purpose with this 
preface is to convey a sense of this history in the hope that this 
contributes in situating to my readers the motivations – or determining 
factors – that made me seek this “road less travelled by.” 
My father (in memoriam) was a professor at this University and 
he introduced me to left politics from an early age. Always driven by a 
critical thrust that was based on a call for ethical engagement with the 
world, he used to talk about science as an emancipatory, knowledge 
construction activity. This way, he taught me to pursue critical 
knowledge. As I’ve mentioned, he was a leftist militant, so he used to 
passionately defend that the primary role of our national intellectuals 
was to resist the political and cultural dominance of the US. My father 
was an anti-(US)imperialist. Then I joined the enemy and took up the 
English undergraduate course at this University. 
Throughout my undergraduate course I felt quite motivated 
towards the study of literature and, in special, of literary theory. I found 
some of our professors’ classes–such as José Roberto O’Shea’s, Sérgio 
Bellei’s, and Eliana Ávila’s–greatly inspiring, and I used to complain 
we didn’t have as many literature classes as we had linguistics and 
language classes (and no offense meant to those whose hearts beat 
harder with those disciplines, but I still defend that our undergraduate 
curriculum could be greatly improved were we to add some more 
classes on literature and on literary theory, after all, literature is 
language at its best). I was lucky enough though to become a member of 
PET-Letras, under the advisory of professor Fábio Luis Lopes da Silva. 
As a member of that group I had the opportunity of getting more 
involved with the university and it was with that group and with 
Professor Fábio that I started seriously reflecting on what it meant to 
study in a public university situated at the world’s periphery. 
In 2007 I took part of our university’s exchange programme with 
the University of Essex. There I was fascinated by professor’s David 
Musselwhite (in memoriam) lectures in the Enlightenment and 
Approaches to Text courses, which made me grow even fonder of 
theoretical studies in literature. 
Having experienced all of this, when I concluded my 
undergraduate course in the end of 2009 I felt this urge to seek further 
study. That’s why, in the second term of 2010, I decided to audit a 
graduate class professor Eliana Ávila was teaching – Caribbean Cultural 
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Studies. It was a blow, a good one. It was in that class that I first got in 
touch with the Jameson/Ahmad debate, and it immediately took hold of 
me, after all, I saw in this debate a perfect staging of a dissatisfaction 
that had long been provoking me: is there no hope for theory? Has 
theory utterly lost its worth and function? Isn’t it possible, even in a 
postmodern globalized world, to construe theory towards 
transformative, emancipatory endeavours? At the same time, I felt the 
strangeness of being the subject of someone’s theorisation, I shared of 
Ahmad’s outrage and resentment: “how dare you theorise me?” “how 
dare you treat me like your civilizational Other?” 
The issue was so enticing to me, so closely related to reflections, 
queries, and dissatisfactions that had long been intriguing me that I 
decided to dedicate to it a couple of years, and I was happy enough to 
have my project accepted by the PGI Programme, under the advisory of 
professor Eliana Ávila. 
All of this means that there is a lot of my father—professor 
Airody Pinheiro dos Santos—in this. And there is also a lot of the 
professors I have mentioned in this accomplishment: Eliana Ávila; 
Fábio Lopes; Bellei; O’Shea; Musselwhite; and others. This thesis is the 
result of their teachings combined with my disquiet. 
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ABSTRACT 
The main argument of this thesis is that the Jameson/Ahmad debate—
articulated mainly around the universalism/particularism discussion—
can be read from a cultural realist perspective, and that such a reading 
provides new possibilities for political engagement in postmodernism. 
The responses to the Jameson/Ahmad debate throughout the years have 
developed from an initial resistance to Jameson’s conceptions—as they 
were seen as rigid concepts that endorsed macroconstructs—
progressively towards an opening up for their polysemic potential, in 
particular in regards to the concept of “national allegory.” With this 
research I seek to advance the debate a step further in this direction, 
suggesting that it is both possible and proficuous to read the debate 
through cultural realist lens, that is, considering the reality effects of 
macroconstructs. Such employment of the macroconstruct, then, far 
from endorsing it, constitutes the possibility for a political engagement 
with these reality effects. 
 
Keywords: “national allegory,” cultural realism, Fredric Jameson, Aijaz 
Ahmad. 
 
71 pages 
22.512 words 
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RESUMO 
O argumento central desta dissertação é de que o debate entre Jameson e 
Ahmad – articulado principalmente em termos da discussão 
universalismo/particularismo – pode ser lido a partir da perspectiva do 
realismo cultural, e que essa leitura proposta permite que emerjam novas 
possibilidades de engajamento político no pós-modernismo. As reações 
ao debate entre Jameson e Ahmad ao longo dos anos partiram de uma 
resistência inicial à proposta de Jameson – conforme seus conceitos 
foram inicialmente interpretados como estruturas rígidas que 
endossavam macroconstruções – progressivamente em direção a uma 
abertura para uma potencial polissemia desses conceitos, em especial em 
relação ao conceito de “alegoria nacional”. Busco com esta pesquisa 
levar o debate um passo adiante nessa direção, sugerindo tanto a 
possibilidade quanto a proficuidade de se ler o debate através da 
perspectiva do realismo cultural, isso é, considerando os efeitos reais 
das macroconstruções. O emprego das macroconstruções, portanto, 
longe de as endossarem, constitui a possibilidade de um engajamento 
político com seus efeitos reais. 
 
Palavras-chave: “alegoria nacional”; realismo cultural; Fredric Jameson; 
Aijaz Ahmad 
 
71 páginas 
22.512 palavras 
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1 – CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate that was started by Fredric Jameson and Aijaz Ahmad 
on the pages of the periodical Social Text in the years of 1986 and 1987 
is open to this date and has resonated in the works of other critics and 
theorists, having also been developed further in the later works of both 
theorists aforementioned. The controversy was incited mainly by 
Jameson´s statement that “all third-world texts are necessarily [. . .] to 
be read as [. . .] national allegories
2
” (69). Jameson’s argument was 
countered by Ahmad, on the grounds that it incurred in a rhetoric of 
otherness, something that is, according to Ahmad, incongruous with the 
attitude of a theorist of Marxist inclination. As Ahmad puts it, Jameson 
“haste[s] in totalising historical phenomena in terms of binary 
oppositions” and, in doing so, he overlooks what Marxism sees as a 
fundamental movement in society: the existence of forces contrary to the 
hegemony (8).  The critic points out that such a problematic method in 
Jameson’s text renders a limiting perspective on Third World literatures. 
Ahmad defends that texts are produced by irreducible ideological 
conditions and that, although it is possible to build generalisations, these 
have to be put into perspective, since texts cannot be easily said to fit 
one category or another (23). Since then, a number of theorists have 
joined either—or even alternative—side(s) of the debate in a prolific 
discussion on the interrelationship of a literary piece and its cultural 
environment. 
This research concerns postcolonial literary theory and literature, 
since the topic of the debate is the literatures of Third World countries in 
relation to—and as compounding elements of—their nations. My 
perspective on the theoretical propositions here approached is concerned 
with the effects of colonialism in the so-called Third World countries. 
 
1.1 – A remark on the concept of the “Third World” 
At this point, a remark on the concept of “Third World” becomes 
necessary and has to be advanced. This remark imposes itself due to the 
                                                          
2 Considering the perspective of cultural materialism, which sees textual meanings necessarily 
materialized through the discursive constructions that constitute them, my aim is to develop a 
close reading of Jameson’s argument in the light of the very controversy to which it led (in 
other words, through the very debate which it engendered and in which it is now imbricated). 
This is why my introduction to his argument shall be limited to quoting the statement which 
incited the controversy. 
2 
significance and pertinence of much of the criticism that has been raised 
against the term, which requires a forward clarification of why and how 
this term is to be deployed throughout this research. Gayatri Spivak, for 
instance, refers critically to the origin of the expression, denouncing the 
intellectual failure in raising an episteme suitable to the “third option” 
that was being brought up in global politics after WW2: 
The initial attempt in the Bandung Conference 
(1955) to establish a third way—neither with the 
Eastern nor within the Western bloc—in the world 
system, in response to the seemingly new world 
order established after the Second World War, 
was not accompanied by a commensurate 
intellectual effort. The only idioms deployed for 
the nurturing of this nascent Third World in the 
cultural field belonged then to positions emerging 
from resistance within the supposedly "old" world 
order—antiimperialism and/or nationalism. 
(Reader 1996: 280) 
Besides the problematic origin of the term “Third World”, its use has 
also performed what KumKum Sangari and others have argued to be a 
reductive, homogenizing effect on the ways communities tagged with 
this term are envisioned. Paraphrasing Sangari, Eliana Ávila underlines 
that “the indiscriminate use of the term has performed the effect of 
homogenizing specific places and thus containing their peoples within 
discursively erected boundaries” (119)
3
. Thus, acknowledging the 
problematic implications of the expression “Third World,” I opt to use it 
critically, as a means of exploring and exposing such a mechanism
4
. 
 
1.2 – Review of literature 
I have mentioned that throughout the twenty-seven years that 
separate us from Jameson’s polemic article and Ahmad’s response to it, 
much literature has been written on the subject. I will briefly present 
some of the most relevant contributions to the debate, following a 
chronological principle of organisation, since I am especially concerned 
with tracing the developments of the debate. 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that Ahmad’s critique of Jameson’s article follows in these same lines, as 
he points out that Jameson reduces the variability and value of the Third World literatures in 
order to provide a homogenous image of them. 
4 For other studies of the concept of “Third World,” see Remi Bachand, and Robert Young. 
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Jean Franco, a British professor who pioneered Latin American 
cultural studies in the UK, writing in 1989, recognises that the novel has 
been appropriated by the intelligentsia to work out imaginary solutions 
to real problems faced by new national formations, but she does not 
agree that “national allegory” characterises Third World literature “for 
not only is ‘the nation’ a complex and much contested term but in recent 
Latin American criticism, it is no longer the inevitable framework for 
either political or cultural projects” (204). Besides that, as the author 
highlights, no particular genre—let alone the “national allegory”—has 
been privileged in Latin America, which is actually characterised by a 
hybridisation of genres. Considering these premises, Franco seeks to 
investigate the pertinence of the term “national allegory” and whether it 
“can be any longer usefully applied to a literature in which nation is 
either a contested term or something like the Cheshire cat’s grin—a 
mere reminder of a vanished body” (205).  
Franco argues that, although the national project has been 
problematized and discussed in Latin American literatures, it has done 
so in more complex ways than the concept of “national allegory” can 
account for. The very feeling of an absence of a reality corresponding to 
the concept of a nation pervaded these literatures, expressing the general 
sense that “[i]ndividual and collective identity, social and family life 
were like shells from which life had disappeared. . . . What they enact is 
the unfinished and impossible project of the modernizing state” (205). 
Through a rich reading of various Latin American texts, Franco shows 
that “national allegory fails to describe adequately the simultaneous 
dissolution of the idea of the nation and the continuous persistence of 
national concerns” (211) pointing that the inscription of these literatures 
under either the concept of the “national allegory” or as postmodern is 
insufficient to deal with their complexities, which demand “readings 
informed by cultural and political history” (209).  
Indeed the cases of Latin America independencies, and, as a 
consequence, of our literatures, are different from those on which 
Jameson builds his theory, as we can see in this passage 
My examples below, then, will be primarily 
African and Chinese; however, the special case of 
Latin America must be noted in passing. Latin 
America offers yet a third kind of development-
one involving an even earlier destruction of 
imperial systems now projected by collective 
memory back into the archaic or tribal. Thus the 
earlier nominal conquests of independence open 
4 
them at once to a kind of indirect economic 
penetration and control-something Africa and 
Asia will come to experience only more recently 
with decolonization in the 1950s and 60s. 
(Jameson, 69) 
The complexity to which Franco makes reference, therefore, is related to 
the processes that led to the Latin American earlier nominal conquests, 
implicating an insertion of capitalism different from that which Jameson 
deploys in his general theory. Considering that, as argued by Jameson, 
the scope of the Latin American and African national independences 
aimed exclusively at the national autonomy, which entails the problem 
vastly commented on that no new consciousness is developed if 
independence is given rather than taken, it is only logical that this will 
reflect in the literatures from these regions. Although Jameson cannot be 
faulted for having overlooked this difference, as he indeed mentioned it, 
Franco’s observation that Jameson’s generalising theory failed at 
describing
5
 Latin American literatures constituted a sharp and pertinent 
criticism to Jameson. 
Michael Sprinker, an American scholar and left-wing 
activist, writing in 1993, welcomes Jameson’s initiative of constructing 
“the bases upon which to incorporate the study of nonmetropolitan 
literatures and cultures into comparative literature, literatures and 
cultures that hitherto have generally been neglected in the West” (4). 
Sprinker contends that Jameson’s response to this issue is to establish a 
connection between “Third World literature and national allegory” (4), 
but this response, Sprinker argues, is quite problematical. Although the 
three authors Sprinker investigates—Fredric Jameson, Aijaz Ahmad, 
and Edward Said—share a conviction that “over the past two centuries 
in world history, the existence and trajectory of virtually every 
nationalism have been significantly inflected by European imperialism’s 
global system” (4), Jameson’s proposal is especially problematic due to 
four reasons listed by Sprinker (some of which in accordance to 
Ahmad’s response): first, the characterization of First World culture as 
being “ineluctably postmodern” in conflation with the assertion that its 
political valence belongs to the realm of the unconscious is reductive; 
second, several films contradict the premise that First World allegorical 
                                                          
5 At this early point of the development of the debate, the focus was on the ontological 
dynamic entailed in Jameson’s formulation. As I show in this research, two other dynamics—a 
hermeneutical and a metacritical one—are later foregrounded. At this point, however, it is 
important to state the terms in which the debate was first installed since my aim here is to trace 
its development from the beginning. 
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forms are “so utterly unconscious of their potential transcoding into 
political readings”; third, Sprinker defends that “what Jameson identifies 
as older, residual ideologies governing Third World cultures [ . . . ] are 
far from being completely effaced in First World cultural practices and 
norms”; finally, materialism cannot be ascribed as the “natural form of 
‘situational consciousness’” exclusive of the Third World, since it is 
also experienced among the poor and the homeless people of the First 
World as well (6-8). 
Having pointed out these problems in Jameson’s text, 
Sprinker starts analysing the possible consequences of Ahmad’s critique 
to contemporary cultural studies, based on three levels: “(1) the level of 
political and social theory (the three worlds), (2) the level of empirical 
cultural description (postmodernism vs. national allegory), (3) the level 
of cultural politics and ideology” (9). Sprinker then brings Said and his 
notion of orientalism into the discussion, criticising also Ahmad’s 
opposition to this theory in the latter’s overall attempt to criticise the 
Three Worlds theory. 
Imre Szeman, a Canadian professor of Cultural Studies, 
writing in 2001, corroborates Jameson's point-of-view, reinterpreting it 
in an attempt to free it from misreadings
6
, arguing that the concept of 
"national allegory" introduces a "model for a properly materialist 
approach to postcolonial texts and contexts" (804). Szeman believes 
Jameson's claim is that postcolonial texts "necessarily and directly 
[speak] to and of the overdetermined situation of the struggles for 
national independence and cultural autonomy in the context of 
imperialism and its aftermath" (808). That would indeed result, 
according to Szeman, in a different relation between the public and the 
private spheres, which would give way to what Jameson terms "national 
allegory," that is, a concept that "points to the ways in which the 
                                                          
6 Although “misreading” may impart the notion (which I am fighting to counter with this 
research) that there is only one “right” reading, one that reaches an essential truth of the text, 
Szeman makes a point that such “misreadings” were intentional and instrumental in the 
definition, by antagonism, of method in postcolonial studies, which were nascent upon 
Jameson’s publication. “In hindsight, it appears that almost without exception critics of 
Jameson’s essay have willfully misread it. [. . .] As one of the first responses to postcolonial 
literary studies from a major critic outside the field, the publication of Jameson’s essay in the 
mid-1980s provided postcolonial critics with a flashpoint around which to articulate general 
criticisms of dominant views of North-South relations expressed within even supposedly 
critical political theories (like Marxism). It also provided a self-definitional opportunity for 
postcolonial studies. [. . .]  While criticisms of Jameson’s views may have thus been useful or 
productive in their own way, they have nevertheless tended to obscure and misconstrue a 
sophisticated attempt to make sense of the relationship of literature to politics in the 
decolonizing world” (804; emphasis added). 
6 
psychological points to the political and the trauma of subalternity finds 
itself 'projected outwards' (allegorically) into the 'cultural'" (810). 
Szeman’s reading of Jameson’s concept of “national allegory” as the 
cultural projection of psychological and political dimensions implies a 
cultural realist approach, which is further discussed on chapter II. 
Julie McGonegal, a Canadian researcher, writing in 2005, 
identifies the postcolonial “overall and at times self-contradictory 
distrust of totality and teleology of any kind” and the “belief that 
allegory is an irretrievably and essentially primitive form of narration” 
as the two greatest sources of criticism to Jameson’s basic thesis. 
Regarding the first of these, McGonegal highlights the limitations that 
the field of postcolonial studies imposes on itself when it rejects 
generalisations of any sort, even of general assertions such as 
Jameson’s, which results in “a certain guardedness against any potential 
incursion of Eurocentrism into its own discursive structures” (252). If 
this tendency (to reject all generalities) is set aside for a moment, one 
can look into the metacritical force of Jameson’s proposition, one that 
considers the fact that Third World texts are always-already-read as 
national allegories. This condition translates the fact that the structural 
differences between “those parts of the world that did the colonising and 
those that were subjected to it” are “maintained and reproduced by a 
First World literary criticism that remains blithely unaware, for the most 
part, of the ways its own historical and social conditions impart various 
givens to the interpretive situation” (253). 
McGonegal’s understanding of Jameson’s concept 
highlights its metacritical force, endorsing the proposition that his is a 
conscious attempt at self-critically dealing with the prefigured positions 
occupied by the First World reader of Third World texts. McGonegal 
notes in the exegesis of Jameson’s work the recurrence of the notion of 
the always-already-read text, pointing out that never before had this 
concept been met with such virulent opposition as when it was 
employed to understanding the hermeneutics of Third World texts. This 
notion seeks to describe the process whereby one gets in touch with a 
text: considering the impossibility of unmediated access to the Other, 
this mediation is necessarily informed by an “anterior set of signs that 
pre-exist in the cultural realm” (254), that is, this mediation is 
necessarily allegorical: third-world texts are always-already-read as the 
representative images of their nations. 
Besides that, McGonegal is careful in analysing the 
specific use of the term “allegory” by Jameson, dissociating it from 
more traditional and limiting views. Jameson’s concept can only be 
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interpreted as limiting if this resignification of allegory is ignored. 
According to McGonegal, “national allegories allow for the possibility 
of disrupting limiting systems of reference, and they do so by 
introducing noncontingent and contradictory meanings that expose the 
breaks and gaps in colonialist logic” (261). 
Margaret Hillenbrand, a British scholar specialised in 
Chinese cultural and literary studies, writing in 2006, analyses the 
history of criticism on Jameson’s concept of national allegory and 
favours his take on the subject. According to the author, in order to 
comprehend Jameson’s text, one must take into account his special 
conceptualisation of the term allegory: “[. . .] [Jameson’s] notion of 
allegory as a mode that operates through fluidity, rather than fixity, of 
form is key [. . .]” (637). Hillenbrand sees this concept as a 
manifestation of postmodernity, and then investigates the presence of 
such a characteristic in Taiwanese postmodern literature. In the final 
remarks of the article, Hillenbrand mentions that it is precisely the split 
(postmodern) nature of allegory that was present in the texts she 
analysed: 
Indeed, what Taiwan’s national allegories offer 
the reader is precisely this: a split mode of 
narrative that precludes any final, fixed, or 
coercive meanings but simultaneously holds out 
the possibility that new kinds of subjectivity can 
be imagined through the evocation of lost, hidden, 
or taboo pasts. (658) 
Brian Larkin, an American anthropology professor specialised in 
African studies and the media, writing in 2009, revisits the 
Jameson/Ahmad debate in order to discuss the film Slumdog Millionaire 
(2008) and its worldwide reception. The film has suffered attacks from 
nationalists concerned with the image of India it projected to the world, 
since it depicted a miserable nation. The very existence of that concern, 
Larkin argues, means that cultural texts do speak for the nation, in the 
line of Jameson’s argumentation. It was this sort of concern that—in 
reaction to the worldwide success of an earlier film, Pather Panchali 
(1955), which also exhibited a miserable India—motivated the 
government to pass regulations establishing that “before any State 
Government sends films . . . abroad for exhibition, the State 
Government should ascertain the film’s suitability from the point of 
view of external publicity” (Erik Barnouw and S. Krishnaswamy apud 
Larkin 167). Such a concern, manifested strongly in government cultural 
policies and in nationalist attacks on the films, shows what Larkin 
8 
believes to constitute a particularity of allegory: that it “is not always a 
feature immanent to a text but is something texts have placed upon them 
through the act of circulation across cultural difference” (164-5). 
Acceding that Ahmad does make some “compelling points,” 
Larkin highlights that he misses “the basic question Jameson raises: 
what is the relation between cultural forms and nationalism?” As the 
critic sees it, “[o]ne can reject Jameson’s totalizing summation (‘all 
Third World texts’) while still interrogating the close imbrication of 
nationalism, literature, and film” (165-6). According to Larkin, although 
Jameson does not focus on the dynamics of the circulation of cultural 
texts, this dynamic is central to his argument, since it is in the mediation 
necessarily entailed in the contact with cultural difference that national 
allegory takes place. This has to do with the “Other reader” that 
Jameson identifies standing, in a position of noncoincidence, between 
the First World reader and the Third World text. According to Larkin, 
[Jameson’s] argument here rests on a radical form 
of alterity that is reflexive in that the haunting 
presence of this second reader is ultimately the 
recognition of cultural, religious, political, and 
social difference. Jameson’s analysis is grounded 
in the difficulty of translation across difference, 
and it is in that precise encounter that the force of 
national allegory is released. (166) 
Larkin concludes that this somewhat neglected development from the 
Jameson/Ahmad debate may usefully inform the debate on the 
“difficulty in analyzing the traffic of cultural forms across national 
boundaries” (167). 
Some authors—such as McGonegal, and Larkin—defend that 
national allegory implies a hermeneutic process rather than an immanent 
feature of the Third World literatures, a process that takes place when 
they are read from a Western, First World, perspective. This notion—
which suggests an inquiry on how Jameson’s project of an intervention 
in the USA humanities curricula can be materialised through the reading 
of such strange texts if it is indeed the reading, and not the Other, that is 
in question—is further discussed on section 3.1 of this thesis. 
Authors who are ready to reassess the meaning of Jameson’s 
concept of “national allegory,” such as Szeman and Hillenbrand, seem 
to be more prone to accepting his general proposition. Indeed Jameson’s 
insistence on a totalizing perspective is easily susceptible to “be 
mistaken as a Eurocentric, universalist claim par excellence”, unless one 
does not consider totality as constituting a “possibility of 
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metacommentary—not as a second step in interpretation but as a 
condition of interpretation per se” (Szeman 805). As we could see in the 
development of the responses to the debate, there is a growing tendency 
towards a need to see Jameson’s proposition as one that, although not 
endorsing the totalities he is operating with, criticises them from the 
inside. The critical realist perspective that is employed in this research 
represents a step forward in that direction. 
 
1.3 – Research questions 
This research was motivated by a call to read the Jameson/Ahmad 
controversy in ways that are attentive to the specific meanings taken on 
by the concept of “national allegory” within the context of each 
participant's contribution to the debate. 
Assuming that Jameson’s and Ahmad’s viewpoints are coherent 
within each of their discourses, the ensuing questions emerged from the 
outset in face of the debate: How can each of these viewpoints 
contribute to the field of Postcolonial Studies? In what ways do these 
critics’ different viewpoints intersect, interrupt, and/or clash with each 
other? What are the meanings that come up once we consider the 
polysemic potential of Jameson’s use of the concept of “national 
allegory”? These questions guided the initial steps of the research, 
entailing two initial hypotheses: first, that Jameson’s argument does not 
reduce the agency
7
 of Third World literatures to the effects of their 
national representations; second, that this understanding can be 
supported by Jameson’s aforementioned essay as well as by much of the 
response to the debate. Assuming these hypotheses were correct, I 
wished to be able to argue for the polysemic potential of the term 
"national allegory" as constructed throughout the debate and its critical 
resonances. 
 
1.4 – Theoretical framework: Cultural Realism 
The main perspective from which I look at the controversy at 
hand is that of Cultural Realism. While acknowledging the hegemonic 
power of cultural representations, this perspective refuses deterministic 
defeatism in face of the impossibility of accessing truth or reality—an 
                                                          
7 Following Butler’s lesson that conceives that, “[t]o be implicated in the relations of power, 
indeed, enabled by the relations of power that the “I” opposes is not, as a consequence, to be 
reducible to their existing forms” (Butler, Bodies that Matter 83). 
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impossibility with which it deals more effectively. In other words, 
cultural materialism invests in the possibilities of agency
8
 by dealing 
with truth-effects and reality-effects instead of essentialist notions of 
truth and reality. This is the sense in which Linda Alcoff and Satya 
Mohanty argue for the need to reconsider identity politics towards 
undoing the closure poised against the term “identity” by postmodernist 
critics: 
Although agreeing with some of the anti-
essentialist critiques of identity that have been 
working to denaturalize identity categories, we 
argue against the conclusion that identities are 
merely fictions imposed from above. We contend 
that identities can be no less real for being socially 
and historically situated, and for being relational, 
dynamic, and, at times, ideological entrapments. 
Moreover, we believe that identity-based 
knowledge can achieve objectivity, not by the 
(unachievable) ideal of the disinterested, passive 
observer, but through a more workable approach 
to inquiry that aims to accurately describe the 
features of our complex, shared world. (6) 
This is the theoretical perspective that informs this research. In two 
senses is this theoretical lens relevant to the present study: 1-Jameson’s 
concept of “national allegory” seems to be one that considers the 
effective factuality—rather than the essentiality—of an observable 
phenomenon in the literatures he is purportedly describing; 2-the debate 
itself can be understood as a cultural materialization of performative 
meanings
9
. 
                                                          
8 Agency can be generally described as a subject's capability of resisting social impositions 
through conscious acts. Even though the notion of agency was developed mainly by Michel 
Foucault, I approach it through the cultural materialist’s further development of the concept, 
since this is really the most pertinent notion for the work here proposed. The cultural 
materialist perspective adds to the definition of agency the understanding that the subject who 
resists is imbricated in the very own power relations they are questioning. As Butler puts it, 
this understanding of agency is "directly counter to any notion of a voluntarist subject who 
exists quite apart from the regulatory norms which she/he opposes. The paradox of 
subjectivation (assujetissement) is precisely that the subject who would resist such norms is 
itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not 
foreclose the possibility of agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory 
practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power” (Butler, 
Bodies that Matter xxiii; emphasis added). 
9 “In the first instance, performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate “act,” 
but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects 
that it names” (Butler, Bodies that Matter xii; emphasis added). 
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I want to argue that the concept “national allegory” can be 
understood in terms of the Hegelian view which, according to Alcoff, 
“locates the source of identity outside the ‘core’ or internal self” (Alcoff, 
Reclaiming 329). Much like the description given by Alcoff of the 
debate between the critics of the concept of “identity” and the 
postpositivist realists who are directing a new perspective on this 
category
10
, here too what matters—if my hypotheses are correct—is not 
the factuality but the reality-effects of “national allegory”.  
As to the fact that the debate itself performatively materialises 
meanings, it is important to notice that this controversy is a discursive 
construction and that, as such, it is an ongoing process of resignifying 
the very terms it deploys. Following this understanding, no attempts are 
made at reaching “true” or “intended” meanings nor are there given 
prior authority on any of the terms composing the controversy. Hence 
the importance of an analysis of the polysemic potential of the term 
“allegory” as it is seized by different critics in this debate. Considering 
this perspective, my analysis follows the development of the most 
relevant concepts involved in the debate as they are initially proposed by 
a critic; then as they are refuted by opposing voices; then as they are 
reasserted or reformulated in reaction to the criticisms to it; and, finally, 
as they appear in the voices of other participants of the debate. 
                                                          
10 “Both might agree that in a certain sense identities are real, insofar as they have real effects 
and correlate to real experiences, but they surely disagree over whether identities are politically 
healthy or reliable sources of truth” (Alcoff, Afraid 334). 
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2 – CHAPTER II: 
The Jameson/Ahmad debate and its historical contexts 
 
2.1 – The USA scenario 
“Our civilization cannot effectively be maintained where it still 
flourishes, or be restored where it has been crushed, without the revival 
of the central, continuous, and perennial culture of the Western world.” 
William Bennet, the chairperson of a study group commissioned to 
assess the state of the learning in the humanities in the US higher 
education, opens his report with this quote by Walter Lippmann. The 
“Report on the Humanities in Higher Education,” issued by the National 
Endowment for the Humanities in the year of 1984, manifested a 
concern with the course the humanities were taking in an age of 
transformation, proposing curricular reform. The tone of the appeal for 
such a reform is given away, if not by the title of the report itself, by the 
aforecited epigraph: the old call (repeated endlessly through the ages) 
for the value of ourselves; the belief that Western civilisation is in 
danger and that its salvation depends on the strengthening of Western 
culture. 
Among the issues that disturbed the study group was the 
identification that “the humanities, and particularly the study of Western 
civilization, have lost their central place in the undergraduate 
curriculum.” Based on this diagnosis and defending the principle that 
the “study of the humanities and Western civilization must take its place 
at the heart of the college curriculum”, the group recommended four 
knowledges as “essential to a college education,” of which I highlight 
the following: “A careful reading of several masterworks of English, 
American, and European literature” (2, 4, 13, 13). 
It is worth investigating by now whether the humanities were 
indeed drifting away from the curriculums or simply changing in aspect. 
For, although Bennett’s definition of “humanities” sounds quite 
encompassing—“the best that has been said, thought, written, and 
otherwise expressed about the human experience
11
” (5; emphasis 
                                                          
11 It should be noted that Bennett borrowed this notion from Matthew Arnold, who, in the 
“Praface” to his book Culture and Anarchy famously said: “The whole scope of the essay is to 
recommend culture as the great help out of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of 
our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the 
best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a 
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added)—his understanding of what comes to constitute a “human 
experience” worthy of the title of “humanities” is doubtlessly very 
restricted, indeed limited to the “English, American, and European” 
traditions (13). The rise and establishment of cultural studies in the US 
challenged that ethnocentric assumption, menacing the traditional view 
of the humanities. It was this old view, not the humanities, that was 
under threat then. Both the problems the study group identified—
revolving around the “decline” in the humanities in the US—and the 
problematic premises and suggestions they present—problematic 
because they are restricted to a call for a traditional(ly) ethnocentric 
understanding of the humanities—reveal the state of the humanities in 
the US in the second half of the 80s, setting the (US) national scenario 
of Jameson’s article that initiates the debate here studied. 
The academic journal Social Text had been launched just a few 
years before that, in 1979, and was in part responsible for establishing—
or rather, for making sense of—the academic environment addressed by 
Bennett’s study group. Refusing the labels of “cultural studies”
12
 and of 
“interdisciplinarity”
13
 precisely because these imply what they were 
                                                                                                                           
stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow 
staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly 
which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically” (5). As professor Bellei 
pointed out during the public defence of this thesis, recalling Marx, history repeats itself, and 
indeed it seems that Arnold advanced, over a hundred years ago, the issues and concerns that 
are related to the development of Cultural Studies and that, therefore, surround the debate here 
studied, that is, the fear that one culture is on the verge of dispersion, which is seen by 
conservatives as something dangerous. 
12 “Social Text is still habitually described as a journal of “cultural studies.” But it is worth 
remembering that in St. Cloud, that phrase was a resonant neologism, an attempt to point to an 
inchoate space of investigation, rather than a declaration of any sort of direct link between the 
currents that led to the journal and the scholarship that was developing at the time at the Centre 
for Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in England. As Jameson puts it bluntly, 
Social Text ‘was founded as a Marxist journal. . . . We really had no access to the work coming 
out of Birmingham. They didn’t have a journal and so we just got rumors about what they were 
doing.’ Brenkman likewise notes that although ‘in retrospect the journal did quite a lot to 
establish and give a shape to cultural studies in the US,’ at the time of its founding the editors 
were not ‘particularly thinking in terms of trying to create a field or a new kind of discipline in 
the academy.’ [. . . ] Even among those who joined later in the 1980s, there is a consensus that 
‘cultural studies’ was not at the center of the journal’s concerns, nor the most accurate term to 
describe the mix of elements it brought together” (Edwards and McCarthy, 2009: 7). 
13 “Our position is that the valuable interpretive and theoretical work done in these various 
schools or traditions is often accompanied by a strategic containment or delimitation of the 
field being interrogated. This strategy of containment, however different it may be in each 
case, generally takes the form of suppressing or repressing history and historical perspective. It 
is this which the Marxist framework seeks to restore. For us, the vitality of dialectical thinking 
lies in its power to rehistoricize methods and positions and resituate them in the immense life 
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resisting—i.e., that the cultural is apart from the political, and that 
disciplines should first be thought of as individually restricted areas that 
should at a later point be brought together—Social Text had been 
catalysing and channelling critical thought and theory, integrating 
culture and politics, having, by 1986, become a powerful medium for 
cultural political interventions of the left in the US. 
In that year, at its 15
th
 issue, the journal appeared to be the 
suitable means for the publication of Jameson’s “Third-World Literature 
in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” an essay he “intended as an 
intervention into a ‘first-world’ literary and critical situation” 
(Response: 26). The essay proved to be quite polemic, having generated 
immediate response by Aijaz Ahmad through the article “Jameson’s 
Rhetoric of Otherness and the National Allegory” (published just two 
issues later, in the 17
th
 edition of the periodical). Ahmad’s response 
remains one of the most powerful critiques to Jameson’s essay until 
today. It was addressed by Jameson in his two-page “Brief Response” in 
the same issue it was published. The controversy, initiated twenty-seven 
years ago, still provokes critical response (cf. section 1.2 of this thesis), 
what evidences that the discussion remains timely and suggests that the 
concepts and issues it deals with have been continually reassessed and 
ressignified throughout the years. In what follows, I pursue a close 
reading of these core texts. 
 
2.2 – Jameson’s “Third-World Literature in the Era of 
Multinational Capitalism” 
The debate starts with Jameson’s essay “Third-World Literature 
in the Era of Multinational Capitalism” (Autumn, 1986), where he 
proposes—on what one can generally describe as a quite hypothetical 
essay—a framework for reading Third World texts from the first-world, 
something he terms “a theory of the cognitive aesthetics of third-world 
literature” (88). In this text, Jameson employs the concept of “national 
allegory” to allude to what he believes to be the necessary presence of a 
political dimension in the libidinal investment of Third World texts. In 
Jameson’s words, “[in third-world texts,] psychology, or more 
specifically, libidinal investment, is to be read in primarily political and 
social terms” (72). Such a political dimension, Jameson argues, was 
overcome in the first-world by the fiction of the centred subject, which 
                                                                                                                           
history of human society from its tribal origins to multinational consumer capitalism and 
beyond” (Aronowitz, Brenkman, and Jameson, 1979: 3). 
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is set apart from the social dimension. Jameson defends that the contact 
with such “alien” texts can redeem the political consciousness of the 
first-world public and intellectuals. 
Conceding that a critique of the humanities was pertinent but 
startled by Mr Bennet’s (“our titular leader”) “embarrassing solution” to 
the problems identified in the humanities—“yet another impoverished 
and ethnocentric Graeco-Judaic ‘great books list’ of the civilization of 
the West”—Jameson points that it is indeed an appropriate moment to 
reassess that tradition in the elaboration of the humanities curricula, but 
going through its “shambles and ruins” instead (67). Jameson’s aim with 
this essay is to attempt a theorisation hypothesis on the Third World 
literatures in order to reassess the “great (Western) books list” tradition. 
Jameson, who had once affirmed “always historicise,” opts to 
begin this text with a non-historicist approach, a choice that may seem 
to counter his inclinations, but which is instrumental to his objectives in 
this text, as I wish to show. According to him, such an approach would 
challenge “our imprisonment in the present of postmodernism and call 
for a reinvention of the radical difference of our own cultural past and 
its now seemingly old-fashioned situations and novelties” (66; emphasis 
in the original). But Jameson’s purpose in this text is quite another: his 
object of inquiry is not the “us” of his discourse, but what he delimits as 
some sort of “other,” the Third World and its literature. Jameson 
defends this “rhetoric of otherness” ( to borrow Ahmad’s wording) is 
excusable because his is an attempt to revalue the other, or rather, to 
identify in this other some quality long lost in the history of his “us.” 
This quality is, notably, the political dimension of literary productions. 
This is, however, just in passing and in the preliminary stages of the 
reasoning he develops. By the end of the essay he is historicising this 
Other. 
Indeed one of Jameson’s objectives with this essay is “to ask 
whether [nationalism] is all that bad in the end” (65). According to the 
critic, nationalism is responsible for connecting the private to the 
political in the Third World, and this sort of engagement is—sadly, in 
Jameson’s opinion—absent from the first-world intellectual and cultural 
scenes. This premise grounds Jameson’s aim at stressing the importance 
and interest of Third World literatures (68). The critic, in this initial 
stage of his argument, characterises Third World literatures as 
“unmodern,” “socially realistic,” and “outmoded” (65, 66, 66), building 
a case that this is how these literatures are perceived by a first-world 
audience, what would, on a superficial analysis, help explain a certain 
resistance of the first-world reader to engage with such texts. 
16 
Jameson, however, goes deeper than that. For the American 
critic, first-world readers’ resistance to Third World texts has to do with 
the fact that these writings “come before us . . . as though already read.” 
Because of this, Jameson goes on to explain, “[w]e sense, between 
ourselves and this alien text, the presence of another reader, of the Other 
reader, for whom a narrative, which strikes us as conventional or naive, 
has a freshness of information and a social interest that we cannot share” 
(66). Jameson suggests that the impact on the first-world reader of this 
encounter with the “Other reader” would be that of forcing them to 
face—and, to a great extent, to “give up”—the illusion of the 
postmodern self, something first-world readers prefer not to do. 
One cannot forget, however that the always-already-read is a 
recurrent concept in Jameson’s writings, having he previously argued 
that 
texts come before us as the always-already-read; 
we apprehend them through sedimented layers of 
previous interpretations, or—if the text is brand-
new—through the sedimented reading habits and 
categories developed by those inherited 
interpretive traditions. This presupposition then 
dictates the use of a method (which I have 
elsewhere termed the ‘metacommentary’) 
according to which our object of study is less the 
text itself than the interpretations through which 
we attempt to confront and to appropriate it. 
Interpretation is here construed as an essentially 
allegorical act, which consists in rewriting a given 
text in terms of a particular interpretive master 
code. (Unconscious, 9-10) 
If the concept of the always-already-read is a constant in Jameson’s 
works, what makes it different here, when applied to understanding 
Third World literatures, if never before had the concept been faced with 
such harsh criticism? The always-already-read stands for a kind of 
mediation, and one could argue that it is a necessary mediation. I tackle 
this issue further on section 3.1 of this thesis, but for now let us say in 
passing that Jameson’s always-already-read is a crucial concept to 
understanding his proposition in this essay because it stands for a sort of 
preconceived set of images
14
 that end up materialising the realities it 
purportedly describes, in a view that is consistent with that of cultural 
                                                          
14 When talking about Third World literatures, Jameson talks about this preconceived set of 
images in terms of “allegory.” 
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realism because the Third World text becomes, in this case, the 
materialization—or the mediation—of the Third World itself. Of course 
Jameson is rather bringing this issue—which is concealed along the 
myth  of the postmodern First World fractured self and its view of its 
Other, the Third World and its unmodern centred self
15
—to a conscious 
level rather than merely corroborating or even describing it. 
In one of Ahmad’s most stringent attacks on Jameson, he 
denounces how Jameson seems to have forgotten that descriptions are so 
ideologically charged that one cannot intend to “merely describe” 
something without concealing their motivations and ideologies (Ahmad 
Rhetoric 6). But isn’t this description one that speaks more of the 
construction of the description itself rather than corroborating it? I 
mean, is not Jameson focusing on how such perception is built and 
believed in? After all, Jameson does repeat, time and again, that Third 
World literatures are “perceived” as, “are to be read as.” 
After having thus delineated the hypothesis that grounds the basic 
proposition of the essay (regarding the interest and value of Third World 
texts, that is, their potential of challenging the myth of the centred self, 
thus resituating politically the First World postmodern subject), Jameson 
quickly addresses the problem with the term “third-world,” showing to 
be sensitive to the problematic generalisation perpetrated through the 
concept “third-world.” Despite that, he uses the term because he does 
not “see any comparable expression that articulates, as this one does, the 
fundamental breaks between the capitalist first-world, the socialist bloc 
of the second world, and a range of other countries which have suffered 
the experience of colonialism and imperialism.” Indeed, he dismisses 
the issue far too superficially, asserting simply that he is “using the term 
‘third-world’ in an essentially descriptive sense,” (67) ignoring 
altogether the criticism to naive conceptions on description that 
overlook the fact that they are always invariably ideologically charged. 
Ahmad later makes use of this conceptual weakness in Jameson’s essay 
to accuse him of deliberately concealing his own ideology (Ahmad; 
Rethoric; 6). 
After having hastily and apparently naively dismissed the issue, 
disclaiming responsibility for his use of the term “third-world,” Jameson 
argues that the scenario of the humanities in the US then—which I have 
delineated above, on section 2.1—required the reassertion of Third 
World literature, without, however, falling into William Bennett’s 
“embarrassing solution: yet another impoverished and ethnocentric 
                                                          
15 See ensuing section for more on Jameson’s elaboration on postmodernism. 
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Graeco-Judaic ‘great books list’ of the civilization of the West” (67). 
Jameson defends that, in the new perspective he is attempting to throw 
on world literature, some specific engagement with Third World 
literature is necessary, announcing this to be the subject of his essay. 
Although Jameson’s premises in the construction of the hypothesis he 
proposes in this essay certainly give room to much criticism
16
, I wish, 
for now, to analyse his theoretical endeavour in terms of his claimed 
objectives. 
It is important to notice that Jameson’s insightful and daring 
hypothesis is quite tentative. Throughout the essay, despite eventual 
assertiveness, Jameson leaves it clear that his theorisation here is 
incipient and certainly deserving of further elaboration. The most 
remarkable instance of this appears just before he starts effectively 
building his case, and I quote it in its full extent because it constitutes 
Jameson’s acknowledgement of the flows immanent to his 
methodological choices: 
It would be presumptuous to offer some general 
theory of what is often called third-world 
literature, given the enormous variety both of 
national cultures in the third world and of specific 
historical trajectories in each of those areas. All of 
this, then, is provisional and intended both to 
suggest specific perspectives for research and to 
convey a sense of the interest and value of these 
clearly neglected literatures for people formed by 
the values and stereotypes of a first-world culture. 
(68; emphasis added) 
Of course, the provisional aspect of his essay does not excuse the 
misrepresentation and reductionism Jameson incurs at some points, but 
what he is asserting here is that his essay is in no way a “final word” on 
the subject. Indeed it has been pointed out that this is not his first 
attempt in that direction either. Szeman traces back the development of 
Jameson’s concept of “national allegory” and finds its origins in the 
1979 book Fables of Aggression (Szeman 814). Ahmad himself 
acknowledges that it is important and valid to attempt to theorise 
totalities, given however that constituent determinations be situated and 
historicised (Ahmad 22). I believe that is what Jameson does when 
                                                          
16 For instance, Jameson’s insistence on a rhetoric of otherness, and his definition of what 
comes to constitute the third-world—“countries that have suffered the experience of 
colonialism and imperialism” (67), which some interpret as situating the Third World as 
merely subjects of history. These issues have indeed been criticised and the engagement with 
this criticism is part mainly of section 2.4 of this thesis. 
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announcing that he is concerned with the literatures produced in regions 
that have “suffered the experience of colonialism and imperialism” (5), 
since the experience of colonialism is, no doubt, at least part of the 
constituent determinations of these countries, and one on which 
Jameson focuses the totalisation he is proposing. 
Jameson starts building his hypothesis with an initial distinction 
set as a basic premise of his general theory of Third World literature: 
that none of the cultures of Third World countries “can be conceived as 
anthropologically independent or autonomous, rather, they are all in 
various distinct ways locked in a life-and-death struggle with first-world 
cultural imperialism” (68). Of course, one could point out that no culture 
is indeed anthropologically independent or autonomous, but the point 
Jameson is making here is that the great conflict generated upon the 
transition of the mode of production of these countries towards what is 
named “modernisation”—and which is indeed another name for 
American imperialism—has a powerful cultural impact. Since 
capitalism did not develop in these countries but was rather imposed 
onto previous modes of production on the event of colonialism and 
imperialism “We”—that is, the capitalist first-world—“are constitutive 
forces powerfully at work on the remains of older cultures in our general 
world capitalist system” (68). 
As Jameson points out, one of the strong characteristics of the 
capitalist culture is the “deep cultural conviction” of the existence of a 
split between the individual and the social, between the psychological 
and the political (69). In the Third World, Jameson argues, the relations 
between these categories are entirely different, they are not split. At this 
point, Ahmad’s intervention suggests that it is only logical, if one 
believes the Third World is defined by having suffered the experience of 
colonialism and imperialism, that the artificial penetration of capitalism 
in these cultures would implicate the penetration, also, of such a strong 
capitalist cultural conviction—especially the Third World intellectuals, 
generally educated in Western schools of thought, as Ahmad points out 
(Rethoric 12-3). Jameson, however, does consider this aspect, when 
arguing that in Third World countries, upon the insertion of capitalism 
and its characteristic split between the private and the public gets in 
conflict with the culture that remains. This remaining culture is 
perceived as a sort of resistance, since it necessarily battles with the 
imposing culture. Its reassertion is, necessarily, the reassertion of the 
collectivity, which is materialised in terms of the Nation. The conflict 
between the traditional mode of thought and the capitalist mode of 
thought is implicated in the scenario Jameson is dealing with. 
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The fact that the Third World intellectual necessarily has to deal 
with this embattlement makes it necessary that their practice be also 
political. In other words, because the nations in the periphery are in 
formation, as it is a process, we are permanently traumatised. This 
trauma, then, becomes the central issue, but a social issue, a historical 
issue, and not a psychological one, an issue that is dealt with through 
political allegories. Jameson asserts that “in the Third World situation 
the intellectual is always in one way or another a political intellectual” 
(74). In face of this embattlement between the capitalist culture that is 
inserted and the traditional culture of the Third World that resists to this 
insertion “no political solutions seem present or visible on the historical 
horizon” (75), and the “literary manifestation of this political problem is 
the possibility of narrative closure” (75-6). In this sense ‘national 
allegory” comes to function as a yet unrealised project of nation:  
The matter of narrative closure, then, and of the 
relationship of a narrative text to futurity and to 
some collective project yet to come, is not, merely 
a formal or literary-critical issue. . . . I want to 
suggest that it is only at this price, by way of a 
complex play of simultaneous and antithetical 
messages, that the narrative text is able to open up 
a concrete perspective on the real future. (77) 
This narrative closure that “open[s] up a concrete perspective on 
the real future” is what Jameson believes should be read as national 
allegory. Ahmad argues that, by affirming that “all third-world texts...” 
Jameson is either incurring in a fallacy (describing Third World 
literatures inaccurately) or in the Law of the Father (being prescriptive, 
saying these literatures should be as he is describing or else he will not 
acknowledge them as Third World literatures). In face of this, one 
should be attentive to the hermeneutic aspect of Jameson’s proposition: 
as McGonegal interestingly points out, Jameson talks in terms of how 
Third World literatures are read by a First World public. Szeman, 
referring to the concept of national allegory as a mode of interpretation, 
questions why would Jameson “have generated a neologism that cannot 
help but invite confusion” (813-4). Jameson however made sure to 
advance that “allegory,” as does symbol, implies one-to-one 
correspondences, but that, in the case of “allegory,” these 
correspondences are fluidic, forever shifting (73). Nation is here, 
therefore, the name of a collective futurity project. Allegory is here the 
way this project is received and interpreted culturally. 
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It is also important to notice that Jameson’s essay targeted the 
intellectuals in the US. He announces: “as this whole talk aims 
implicitly at suggesting a new conception of the humanities in American 
education today, it is appropriate to add that the study of the role of the 
intellectual as such ought to be a key component in any such proposals” 
(75). He defends that the First World intellectual should step outside the 
myth of the individual subject so as to be able to engage politically as 
Third World intellectuals do. The initial resistance to these texts are but 
an evidence of the need to face this difference in order to be able to 
break with the political sterility of intellectuality. This is what Jameson 
hopes may be achieved with the inclusion of Third World literatures in 
the curriculums of the humanities. 
Jameson recalls Edward Said, acknowledging that, in building his 
general theory, he is performing a “strategy of otherness.” He, however, 
prefers to perform such strategy since he sees no alternative without 
falling “into some general liberal and humanistic value” (77). Ahmad 
later tackles this issue, pointing out there are alternatives that should not 
escape a Marxist scholar. He affirms thus that “[w]hat gives the world 
its unity . . . is not a humanist ideology but the ferocious struggle of 
capital and labour which is now strictly and fundamentally global in 
character” (Ahmad 10). Interestingly, it is this struggle and its 
reverberation in the cultural level that Jameson is addressing in his 
theory. If both theorists are concerned with the same issue through the 
same theoretical lens, the cause of their divergence seems to be that each 
of these Marxist scholars have different perspectives on reading that 
struggle: Ahmad proposes the understanding of the present on the basis 
of the past, whereas Jameson proposes the understanding of the present 
on the basis of the future, in the form of the futurity project of a 
collectivity. This is why Jameson affirms that 
‘culture’ . . . is by no means the final term at 
which one stops. One must imagine such cultural 
structures and attitudes as having been 
themselves, in the beginning, vital responses to 
infrastructural realities (economic and geographic, 
for example), as attempts to resolve more 
fundamental contradictions-attempts which then 
outlive the situations for which they were devised, 
and survive, in reified forms, as ‘cultural 
patterns.’ Those patterns themselves then become 
part of the objective situation confronted by later 
generations, and, . . . having once been part of the 
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solution to a dilemma, then become part of the 
new problem. (76-7) 
With that in mind, Jameson suggests that cultural—or national—
identity, when invoked by a Third World writer, must be examined 
against the “concrete historical situation” in order to determine the 
“political consequences of the strategic use of this concept” (78). This is 
a more complex understanding of nationalism. 
In order to delineate the specific character of Third World 
national allegories, Jameson points out that Western literature also 
presents some instances of “national allegory,” but they present two of 
what Jameson terms “structural differences” in relation to the national 
allegories of the Third World. The first one is that, in Western literature, 
Jameson argues, the presence of national allegories reconfirms the 
political/individual split. Second, in the First World, allegory of that 
kind is unconscious and must therefore be deciphered, whereas Third 
World allegories are “conscious and overt” (79-80). Besides that, 
Jameson acknowledges that auto-referentiality is something similar to 
“national allegory” in Western literature, but it also presents a difference 
which Jameson believes is better understood in terms of the situational 
consciousness—a term Jameson prefers to materialism. 
Jameson draws his understanding of situational consciousness 
from Hegel’s Master-slave dialectics, according to which “only the slave 
knows what reality and the resistance of matter really are; only the slave 
can attain some true materialistic consciousness of his situation, since it 
is precisely to that that he is condemned. The Master, however, is 
condemned to idealism” (Jameson 85). In the global scenario, Jameson 
argues, the US is in the position of the Master, doomed to ignorance of 
the social totality concealed by a host of fragmented subjectivities, 
whereas the “third-world culture . . .  must be situational and materialist 
despite itself” (85). In the final footnote to his essay, Jameson clarifies 
that what he here terms “national allegory” is a form of “mapping of the 
totality” (87-8). 
In reading the essay that initiated the debate, one cannot help but 
noticing the highly hypothetical intention of Jameson’s article as a 
whole, as he states, from the start, that “[a]ll of this . . . is provisional.” I 
would like to argue that this hypothetical character of his essay indicates 
that this attempt of “offer[ing] some general theory of what is often 
called third-world literature” (68) is a part of what we could term a 
work-in-progress. This aspect gains particular relevance with Jameson’s 
statement, in the last endnote of “Third-World Literature in the Era of 
Multinational Capitalism,” that relates the basic proposition of his essay 
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to a previous text (“Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism”). “National allegory,” Jameson argues, is but an instance of 
the mapping of the social totality as he delineated in that previous text 
and the essay on Third World Literature “forms a pendant to the essay 
on postmodernism” (87-8). This correlation is of the most relevance 
and, as Ahmad puts it, is part of an “ambitious undertaking which 
pervades the entire text” (3). In face of the conclusion that the essay that 
constitutes the focus of the present study is part of an ongoing 
theoretical development, I now pursue a close reading of Jameson’s 
essay on Postmodernism, since it is central to this study, as I will show 
in the ensuing section. 
 
2.3 – Jameson’s “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism” 
The final footnote of Jameson’s article refers back to his famous 
essay “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” 
published in 1984. This footnote, although coming late in the text, 
unequivocally situates the entire argument of his text within the scope of 
that previous article, as he affirms that “the present essay . . . forms a 
pendant to the essay on postmodernism . . . .” The connection between 
the two articles comes through the concept of “national allegory,” 
central to the essay on third-world literatures, and that is precisely an 
instance of what he had articulated in the previous text as “cognitive 
mapping,” as we shall see in this section. In Jameson’s words, “[w]hat is 
here called "national allegory" is clearly a form of just such mapping of 
the totality” (87-88). Given the substantial relevance of that previous 
text for the analysis at hand, a close reading of it becomes necessary to 
inform this research. 
In that text, Jameson analyses the effects of third-wave 
capitalism—which is at times praised as post-industrial and is at times 
criticised for its superficiality—on culture, arguing that postmodernism 
is a cultural dominant. The text is divided into six parts, where Jameson 
characterises the most distinctive features of postmodernism, proposing 
an aesthetic that is fit for the new social and spatial configuration, an 
aesthetic that he terms “cognitive mapping.” 
The article opens with a general account of postmodernism and 
how it is perceived, emphasizing the widespread feeling of rupture that 
is translated in the commonplace expression “the end of ___.” Although 
postmodernism has reached all art forms, Jameson defends that it is 
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more “dramatically visible” in architecture, where the clash between 
high-modernism and postmodernism raises more heated critical 
discussions. For him, postmodernism translates into a sort of aesthetic 
populism in architecture, a manifestation of “one fundamental feature of 
all the postmodernisms . . .: namely, the effacement in them of the older 
(essentially high-modernist) frontier between high culture and so-called 
mass or commercial culture.” Thus, this break is characteristic of the 
new type of society characterised by multinational capitalism, the so-
called “post-industrial society” (54). 
Jameson then stresses that this article intends to offer a 
periodising hypothesis, recognising postmodernism as a cultural 
dominant. He claims that postmodernism differs from modernism 
mainly because it is institutionalised, which results in commissioning 
and consequent commodification of the arts, with architecture being the 
art form which is closest to the economy. In this relation to economy, 
Jameson emphasises that American postmodernism is the other side of 
worldwide exploration and domination. Thus, the distinction between 
modernism and postmodernism is this relation to the economic order, 
which makes the two moments bear different meanings and social 
functions (56-7). Jameson is careful in assessing the risks of proposing 
totalising conceptions and justifies his intent, affirming that, although 
totality projects tend to paralyse critical capacity—in face of a certain 
inevitability they seem to imply—his proposition aims at generating a 
possible means to reflect on the possibility of “any radical cultural 
politics today” (57). 
 Once that remark is made, the author delineates the main features 
characteristic of postmodernism as follows: a new depthlessness both in 
contemporary theory and in the culture of the image (simulacrum), 
which bears as a consequence the weakening of historicity—implicating 
schizophrenic relationship structures—, a new emotional ground tone 
(intensities)—that is responsible for the “postmodern (hysterical) 
sublime”—, and a new relationship to technology (57-8). In what 
follows I present a brief explanation of each of these features, as 
Jameson’s take on postmodernism is of utmost importance for his article 
on Third World literatures. 
Analysing two works of art that have become epitomic of their 
periods—namely, Van Gogh’s “Peasant Shoes,” typical of high-
modernism, and Andy Warhol’s “Diamond Dust Shoes,” characteristic 
of postmodernism—Jameson exemplifies how this new depthlessness is 
manifested in the arts. In modern art, there is an evocation of the real-
material world, requiring an interpretive action to reach its latent 
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meaning, whereas postmodern art does not evoke anything, since it does 
not speak to us, functioning in the content-level of the fetish. This strong 
contrast allows Jameson to affirm that “a new kind of flatness or 
depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense—[is] 
perhaps the supreme formal feature of all the postmodernisms” (60). 
This feature bears two consequences: what Jameson terms the “waning 
of affect” and the “euphoria and self-anihilation”. 
The waning of affect is identified, symptomatically, in the 
widespread critique of hermeneutic, which is, according to Jameson, a 
“depth model.” The author identifies four other depth models that have 
suffered the attack of postmodern criticism: 
the dialectical one of essence and appearance . . . ; 
the Freudian model of latent and manifest . . . ; the 
existential model of authenticity and 
inauthenticity . . . ; and finally, latest in time, the 
great semiotic opposition between signifier and 
signified . . . . [H]ere too depth is replaced by 
surface, or by multiple surfaces (what is often 
called intertextuality is in that sense no longer a 
matter of depth).” This depthlessness, Jameson 
affirms, “can be experienced physically and 
literally. (61-2) 
Regarding euphoria and self-anihilation, Jameson points to a 
“shift in the dynamics of cultural pathology [that] can be characterized 
as one in which the alienation of the subject[, characteristic of 
modernism,] is displaced by the fragmentation of the subject” (63). This 
phenomenon translates the theme of the “‘death’ of the subject itself = 
the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual—and 
the accompanying stress, whether as some new moral ideal or as 
empirical description, on the decentring of that formerly centred subject 
or psyche,” resulting in a loss of what used to accompany the notion of 
that subject, such as personal style (64). Another possible 
characterisation of the waning of affect, Jameson argues, is the primacy 
of categories of space rather than of time in our daily life. 
As a consequence of the elements just discussed—the dissolution 
of the bourgeoisie individual subject and, along with it, the 
disappearance of the personal style—the practice of pastiche is 
widespread. Pastiche, according to Jameson, is “blank parody,” since it 
is an imitation of dead styles, like parody, but devoid of any of the 
parody’s ulterior motives. Since personal style no longer exists, the 
imitation of the past is the only resource available. Because of this, one 
verifies a spread of historicism, defined by architecture historians as 
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“the random cannibalization of all the styles of the past, the play of 
random stylistic allusion, and in general what Henri Lefebvre has called 
the increasing primacy of the ‘neo’” (64-5). Jameson reappropriates 
Plato’s conception of the simulacrum—“the identical copy for which no 
original has ever existed”—to account for this new society where the 
image itself replaces the world, which influences our relationship to the 
historical time, affecting the construction of our collective future as a 
consequence (65-6). The simulacrum—the culture of the image 
characteristic of a society in which the image itself replaces the world—
affects our relationship to historical time, affecting the construction of 
our collective future.  In the ensuing paragraph, pastiche is shown to 
influence the waning of historicity as well, since it replaces real history 
with the “history of aesthetic styles.” 
The historical recovery of the past is also influenced by the 
culture of the simulacrum, what affects the construction of collective 
futurity projects as well. This relation to the image in its recovery of the 
past is yet another difference between modern and postmodern culture: 
if the modern nostalgia consisted of an aesthetic retrieval of the past, the 
postmodern nostalgia is manifested through an “ideology of the 
‘generation’” which installs a nostalgia of a collective past, replacing 
‘real history’ with the “history of aesthetic styles” (66-7). The two 
elements, the pastiche and the simulacrum are, therefore, symptoms of 
the postmodern waning of historicity, resulting in the  
evident existential fact of life that there no longer 
does seem to be any organic relationship between 
the American history we learn from the 
schoolbooks and the lived experience of the 
current multinational, high-rise, stagflated city of 
the newspapers and of our own daily life. (69) 
Jameson defends that such non-correspondence between “real” history 
and the reified aesthetic history causes a déja-vu effect, marked by what 
Freudian long ago termed the return of the repressed. 
The waning of historicity is present even in the sentence 
level, in what Jameson identifies as the loss of the radical past. 
This historical novel can no longer set out to 
represent the historical past; it can only 
‘represent’ our ideas and stereotypes about that 
past (which thereby at once becomes ‘pop 
history’). Cultural production is thereby driven 
back inside a mental space which is no longer that 
of the old monadic subject, but rather that of some 
degraded collective ‘objective spirit’: it can no 
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longer gaze directly on some putative real world, 
at some reconstruction of a past history which was 
once itself a present; rather, as in Plato’s cave, it 
must trace our mental images of that past upon its 
confining walls. If there is any realism left here, 
therefore, it is a ‘realism’ which is meant to derive 
from the shock of grasping that confinement, and 
of slowly becoming aware of a new and original 
historical situation in which we are condemned to 
seek History by way of our own pop images and 
simulacra of that history, which itself remains 
forever out of reach. (71) 
This introjection into the mental structure of postmodernism through 
language is of utmost relevance for the argument Jameson later develops 
in the “Third World Literature” since it understands signification as no 
longer entailing a relation to a material world, but to simulacra. As he 
argues in the later article, cultures that are not dominated by the 
postmodern cultural dominant signify differently. 
In the third section of the article, Jameson draws an aesthetic 
model from Lacan’s account of schizophrenia—the “breakdown of the 
signifying chain”—to suggest that the crisis in historicity, manifested in 
all levels previously described, imparts a reduction to an “experience of 
pure material Signifiers, or in other words of a series of pure and 
unrelated presents in time” (72). In the cultural text, this schizophrenia 
appears as “something closer to a sentence in free-standing isolation” 
(73). In this world of signifiers, radical difference installs itself, 
requiring that the postmodernist viewer captures the whole of the 
isolated and radically different parts, through a mechanism Jameson 
names collage. The generalisation of the schizophrenic procedure allows 
for a shift of affect, substituting the intensity of euphoria for the 
intensities of anxiety and alienation (74-5). 
The above formulations are particularly relevant for the text on 
Third World literatures in a twofold dimension:  a) as Jameson sees it, 
Third World texts unavoidably bear a relation to the material world 
itself, that is, Third World texts are not mediated by the image culture  
in the process Jameson is here describing as simulacrum; b) Third 
World texts are, however, received by the US public as these images, 
that is, as well as US history has become a style of nostalgia through 
simulacrum and pastiche, Third World text is only accessed by the First 
World public allegorically. Although this process grounds the 
schizophrenia and the particular instances of affect/intensity here 
described, it is also the cause of the excruciating feeling of lack of 
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reference. In the later text on Third World literatures, Jameson presents 
“national allegory” as a viable solution for this loss of reference, a 
means of socially mapping one’s position in the global scenario. In this 
sense, one can read Jameson’s conception not as an affirmation that 
Third World texts lack something in relation to US texts, but as the 
suggestion that the US culture has lost its own self-referential mirror, 
substituting it for a mirroring of mirrors in a manner that, although 
imparting some degree of affect and intensity, has deprived the First 
World of the factual possibility of political engagement. The cultural 
dominant of Postmodernism operates in the First World by limiting its 
possible contact with the Third World, so that it can only be accessed by 
the simulacra of the Third World, that is, by the image the First World 
has of the Third World (a copy of which there is no original), something 
Jameson terms “national allegory”. 
The body, and, consequently, society itself, is yet another 
category that is influenced by postmodernism and its characteristics. In a 
formulation Jameson will name “camp or ‘hysterical’ sublime” (77), he 
conceptualises the effect of postmodernism in our relationship to Nature 
itself, arguing that it has also been eclipsed. As Jameson puts it, “[t]he 
other of our society is in that sense no longer Nature at all, as it was in 
precapitalist societies, but something else which we must now identify” 
(77). This brings a new relationship to technology as well: Jameson 
follows Ernest Mendel’s outline of three “quantum leaps in the 
evolution of machinery under capital”, each introducing a dialectical 
expansion (77). Rejecting the expression “postindustrial” Jameson 
characterises the present day stage of capital as “multinational capital,” 
consisting of the “purest form of capital yet to have emerged, a 
prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas” 
(78). This technological stage, differently from the preceding ones, 
holds a representational challenge, since it cannot be embodied in a 
single image (such as a turbine or pipes, which could serve as 
representations of the previous eras). In an ingenious interpretation of 
this unrepresentability, Jameson suggests that 
our faulty representations of some immense 
communicational and computer network are 
themselves but a distorted figuration of something 
even deeper, namely the whole world system of 
present-day multinational capitalism. The 
technology of contemporary society is therefore 
mesmerizing and fascinating, not so much in its 
own right, but because it seems to offer some 
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privileged representational shorthand for grasping 
a network of power and control even more 
difficult for our minds and imaginations to 
grasp—namely the whole new decentred global 
network of the third stage of capital itself. (79-80) 
The postmodern sublime can only be adequately theorised within this 
greater notion, which Jameson names the “apotheosis of capitalism.” 
Built space also presents the characteristics of postmodernism, 
and Jameson defends that “we do not yet possess the perceptual 
equipment to match this new hyperspace” (80). Constructions such as 
the Bonaventura Hotel—which Jameson analyses as an exponent of 
postmodern architecture—are built as a sort of miniature city, a whole 
world unrelated to the city surrounding it. It is also built in a way that 
imposes and limits the narratological possibilities of the subject within 
it. This mutation in physical space succeeds in 
transcending the capacities of the individual 
human body to locate itself, to organize its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and 
cognitively to map its position in a mappable 
external world. And I have already suggested that 
this alarming disjunction point between the body 
and its built environment . . . can itself stand as 
the symbol and analogue of that even sharper 
dilemma which is the incapacity of our minds, at 
least at present, to map the great global 
multinational and decentred communicational 
network in which we find ourselves caught as 
individual subjects (83-4). 
The final section of the article entails a proposition to counter the 
most perilous consequence of his main argument—i.e. that 
postmodernism is the cultural dominant of the late capitalist 
development, characterised by a generalised sense of both physical and 
social disconnection/alienation/loss that paralyses the possibilities of 
political engagement—calling thus for a reopening for the possibility of 
political engagement and change through the suggestion of a means—
namely, the cognitive mapping—for the individual and collectivities to 
resituate themselves in relation to the totality, even when inhabiting the 
postmodern hyperspace. This is the most relevant section of the article 
for the sake of this research, since here Jameson conceptualises the 
cognitive mapping, a concept that was in his later writing further 
developed into the concept of “national allegory—”the form of 
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cognitive mapping that is specific to the Third-World situation
17
—in the 
latter article. 
In this section, Jameson stresses that postmodernism is a 
historical rather than a stylistic category, affirming that understanding it 
otherwise is to make a “category-mistake.” The stylistic notion of 
postmodernism is restricted to the realm of “moral judgements,” and 
Jameson rejects both the positive and the negative moral judgements
18
 
that are possible through that sort of reasoning. Yet he claims that we 
are “so deeply immersed in postmodernist space . . . that the luxury of 
old-fashioned ideological critique . . . becomes unavailable” (85-86). It 
is in face of this unavailability that it becomes imperative to propose a 
“genuinely dialectical attempt to think our present of time in History.” 
This is, however, to be performed in the difficult fashion proposed by 
Marx to assess capitalism: “to think this development positively and 
negatively all at once” (86). 
The effort required to think like that suggests two immediate 
questions, which Jameson articulates as follows: 
Can we in fact identify some ‘moment of truth’ 
within the more evident ‘moments of falsehood’ 
of postmodern culture? And, even if we can do so, 
is there not something ultimately paralysing in the 
dialectical view of historical development 
proposed above; does it not tend to demobilize us 
and to surrender us to passivity and helplessness, 
by systematically obliterating possibilities of 
action under the impenetrable fog of historical 
inevitability? (86) 
In order to tackle those issues, Jameson first reflects on the “mutation of 
the sphere of culture in the world of late capitalism, which includes a 
momentous modification of its social function” (86). One of the 
consequences of postmodernism is what Jameson terms an “explosion” 
of the sphere of culture, an explosion that dissolves the autonomous 
sphere of culture, as opposed to the semi-autonomy that culture seemed 
to enjoy before the advent of postmodernism, when it existed “above the 
practical world of the existent” (87). This explosion entails a 
“prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the 
                                                          
17 The Third-World situation is, according to Jameson, that of a conflict between more 
traditional modes of production and the insertion of capitalism already in its late form (cf. 
Literature). 
18 The positive ones, Jameson explains, are comprised of a “celebration of this aesthetic new 
world,” and the negative ones refer to the “essential triviality” that would be characteristic of 
the period from an aesthetic viewpoint. 
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point at which everything in our social life . . . can be said to have 
become ‘cultural’ in some original and as yet untheorized sense” (87). 
Another consequence is the extinction of the possibility of 
achieving critical distance, something that used to form the basis of our 
conceptions of cultural politics. According to Jameson, “distance in 
general (including ‘critical distance’ in particular) has very precisely 
been abolished in the new space of postmodernism. We are submerged 
in its henceforth filled and suffused volumes to the point where our now 
postmodern bodies are bereft of spatial coordinates and practically (let 
alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation” (87). As a result of that 
abolition of critical distance we observe that all cultural forms of 
political intervention and of cultural resistance are “all somehow 
secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves 
might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no distance from 
it” (87). 
The postmodern reconfiguration of space presents a “genuine 
historical (and socio-economic) reality,” one that calls for its own forms 
of representation, in what Jameson sees as “new forms of realism (or at 
least of the mimesis of reality)” (88). Like all art forms, postmodern 
realism can be analysed as representing their social reality or as 
distracting and diverting from it. Regarding that reality itself, Jameson 
calls for a double reading of it, in the sake of the dialectic thinking he is 
defending. This new reality “demands the invention and elaboration of 
an internationalism of a radically new type” (88). 
Before moving on to proposing a “possible form of a new radical 
cultural politics,” Jameson makes an aesthetic proviso: a defence of the 
pedagogical and didactic functions of art. The cultural model he 
proposes “foregrounds the cognitive and pedagogical dimensions of 
political art and culture” (89). Besides that, the model he is proposing is 
appropriate to our own situation, as delineated in the previous sections 
of the article. Given that space is the fundamental category in 
postmodern culture, the cultural model proposed has to be 
fundamentally space-related.  Jameson then proposes the aesthetic of the 
“cognitive mapping,” based in Kevin Lynch’s lesson in The Image of 
the City, which Jameson brings into a convergence with Althusser’s 
(and Lacan’s) redefinition of ideology, reaching an original conception 
on the relationship between the individual and the totality surrounding 
them. 
Lynch’s work teaches that 
the alienated city is above all a space in which 
people are unable to map (in their minds) either 
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their own positions or the urban totality in which 
they find themselves . . . . Disalienation in the 
traditional city, then, involves the practical 
reconquest of a sense of place, and the 
construction or reconstruction of an articulated 
ensemble which can be retained in memory and 
which the individual subject can map and remap 
along the moments of mobile, alternative 
trajectories. (89) 
Although Lynch’s proposition is restricted to the city itself, Jameson 
projects it “outwards onto some of the larger national and global 
spaces,” provoking a convergence of Lynch’s theory with the 
Althusserian (and Lacanian) redefinition of 
ideology as ‘the representation of the subject’s 
Imaginary relationship to his or her Real 
conditions of existence’. Surely this is exactly 
what the cognitive map is called upon to do, in the 
narrower framework of daily life in the physical 
city: to enable a situational representation on the 
part of the individual subject to that vaster and 
properly unrepresentable totality which is the 
ensemble of the city’s structure as a whole. (90) 
A second development that Jameson derives from Lynch’s work is the 
notion that, as well as, in the development of the science and art of 
cartography, the advent of new instruments—such as the compass—and 
calculations—such as triangulation—has brought about new 
possibilities of cartographic thought, so it “becomes clear that there can 
be scientific progress, or better still, a dialectical advance, in the various 
historical moments of map-making” (90). 
The Althusserian definition of ideology brings two implications 
to Jameson theorisation: first, the possibility of thinking cartographically 
in terms of social space, since “we all necessarily also cognitively map 
our individual social relationship to local, national and international 
class realities
19
”; second, the suggestion of a methodological enrichment 
through the remobilization of and old and still valuable Marxian 
distinction between science and ideology, according to which the 
ideology is thought of as a bridge over the gap between the existential 
and the realm of abstract knowledge, between existential experience and 
scientific knowledge, “somehow inventing a way of articulating those 
                                                          
19 Ahmad accuses Jameson of not considering, in the latter text on Third World literatures, the 
issue of class. But Jameson’s proposition here is indeed related to how the subject can trace 
their position in a mappable social global space. 
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two distinct dimensions with each other” (91). The Marxian-
Althusserian understanding of science and ideology correspond to the 
Lacanian Real and Imaginary, respectively. Althusser has, however, left 
aside the third realm of Lacan’s system, that of the Symbolic. Jameson’s 
cognitive mapping is related to that realm. The article closes with the 
delineation of the aesthetic of cognitive mapping, calling for the need 
“to respect this now enormously complex representational dialectic and 
to invent radically new forms in order to do it justice” in a way that 
considers the present day physical and social postmodern space, taking 
its problematics into account and achieving a “breakthrough to some as 
yet unimaginable new mode of representing this last, in which we may 
again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects 
and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized 
by our spatial as well as our social confusion” (92). This concern bases 
Jameson’s proposition of the “national allegory” in the ensuing 
publication, something he proposes as a means to regaining that 
capacity. 
 
2.3.1 – From the symbolical to the allegorical 
Perhaps one of the greatest issues in the relationship between the 
two texts is how and why what is thought of as symbolic in the first text 
becomes allegorical in the second text. If the “national allegory” is an 
instance of the “cognitive mapping,” just what is the particularity—
aesthetic or social—of this specific type of mapping in relation to the 
original formulation? In “Postmodernism,” Jameson lucubrates on the 
relation of the cultural dominant of postmodernism to economy: the 
difference between First and Third World has to do, then, with the state 
and development of the economies of these regions. In his “Brief 
Response,” Jameson synthesises the issue: regarding the term “first 
world” it “is based . . . on the fact that American bankers hold the levels 
of the world system” (27). I believe the different stances occupied by the 
First and the Third Worlds in the global economic order may be the 
grounds for the shift from symbol—in the “Postmodernism” text—to 
allegory—in the “Third-World Literature” text. Since the Third World 
has not lived the fiction of the bourgeois monad ego but, due to the 
insertion of late capitalism, is exposed to the myth of the fractured self, 
a cultural tension between the traditional subject in the cultural order 
and the fractured self in the economic order sets the context of a 
superstructural embattlement that is perceived allegorically. 
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2.4 – Ahmad’s “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the 
‘National Allegory’” 
Despite the fact that Jameson acknowledges to be incurring in a 
“strategy of otherness” through an operation of differentiation—which 
he prefers to the alternative of “falling back into some general liberal 
and humanistic universalism” (Jameson 77)—it is mainly on those 
grounds that Aijaz Ahmad, in the essay “Jameson’s Rhetoric of 
Otherness and the ‘National Allegory’” (Autumn, 1987), accuses him of 
projecting a reductionist view on the Third World and its culture: “[a]s 
for the specificity of cultural difference, Jameson's theoretical 
conception tends, I believe, in the opposite direction, namely, that of 
homogenisation. Difference between the first world and the third is 
absolutised as an Otherness . . .” (Ahmad Rethoric 10). Ahmad performs 
a thorough scrutiny of Jameson’s article, proposing, in order to counter 
Jameson’s “cognitive aesthetics of the third-world literature” (Jameson 
Literature 88), that “[l]iterary texts are produced in highly 
differentiated, usually very over-determined contexts of competing 
ideological and cultural clusters, so that any particular text of any 
complexity shall always have to be placed within the cluster that gives it 
its energy and form, before it is totalised into a universal category” 
(Ahmad Rethoric 23). Ahmad’s text was published on the 17
th
 issue of 
Social Text, and Jameson’s two-page “Brief Response” to it, where 
Jameson addresses some of Ahmad’s most pertinent statements, came in 
that same issue. 
Aijaz Ahmad has for many years been a chief critic of the Three 
Worlds Theory. Since this theory is a premise Jameson takes for granted 
as the basis of his theory, Ahmad’s response to Jameson’s essay is 
greatly based on his misgivings to this theory as a whole. He, thus, 
affirms that to claim the Third World “as a basis for producing 
theoretical knowledge, which presumes a certain rigor in constructing 
the objects of one's knowledge, is to misconstrue not only the phrase 
itself but even the world to which it refers” (4). The problem with the 
referred misconstruction is, mainly, the reductionism it performs, and, 
according to Ahmad, third-world literature simply cannot be constructed 
as a “coherent object of theoretical knowledge” (4). 
Jameson indeed showed to have little to say on the subject, since 
in his essay he dismissed the issue by simply acknowledging that the 
term did imply a great level of reduction but that he was “using the term 
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‘third world’ in an essentially descriptive sense, and objections to it do 
not strike me as especially relevant to the argument I am making” 
(Jameson Literature 67). Ahmad however makes a point that 
“‘description’ is never ideologically or cognitively neutral” and that it is 
indeed a tool for ideological domination (6). 
When analysing the object Jameson is purportedly describing, 
Ahmad finds a great inconsistency: the first and the third-worlds are 
defined by their production systems, whereas the Third World is defined 
by an experience imposed on them. From this view, the Third World is 
merely a subject of history, not its agent. Furthermore, Ahmad adds, 
Jameson’s proposition is empirically ungrounded—India, Ahmad 
reminds us, is quite capitalist, for instance. Ahmad defends that the 
Three Worlds Theory defines the Third World as that which has 
experienced colonialism. From that perspective, nationalism would be 
the only ideology possible and, as a consequence of that, “national 
allegory” would be the only narrative possible. 
Besides that, Ahmad points out some inconsistencies in 
Jameson’s argument as a whole. The first one is that Jameson 
generalises in one sense—describing the Third World as the first-
world’s Other, given that the cultures of the Third World share the 
experience of colonialism—but does not generalise in another, more 
appropriate, sense—the experience of the first-world is not generalised. 
Ahmad thus points out that a) we live not in three worlds, but in one 
which presents a contradictory unity—the struggle between capitalism 
and socialism, which is different everywhere; and b) the first-world is 
the one that indeed shares an experience—that of the cultural logic of 
late capitalism—whereas the Third World presents an “enormous 
cultural heterogeneity of social formations” (9-10).  It follows from that 
reasoning that Jameson’s proposition is an epistemologically impossible 
category, since there is no single experience of colonialism. In face of 
that conclusion, Ahmad affirms that “one is not quite sure whether one 
is dealing with a fallacy (‘all third-world texts are’ this or that) or with 
the Law of the Father (you must write this if you are to be admitted into 
my theory)” (12). 
Jameson oversees yet another important factor, according to 
Ahmad: upon colonialism, capitalism is inserted in the colonised nation, 
and, consequently, the capitalist ideology of the individual self (at least 
in the bourgeoisie) is introduced as well. Thus, Jameson should concede 
that at least some of the texts from colonised formations are not 
“national allegory,” that is, at least some of them may present the 
libidinal/political split. I believe Jameson did consider that, though not 
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reaching into the same conclusion as Ahmad. Jameson puts the issue 
this way “We”—that is, the first-world—“are constitutive forces 
powerfully at work on the remains of older cultures in our general world 
capitalist system” (Jameson Literature 68). 
The third inconsistency Ahmad points out in Jameson’s essay is 
that Jameson seems to overlook—not to situate—the mode of 
production of the Third World. He does not characterise the Third 
World as pre- or non- capitalist. Based on a previous text by Jameson 
(Marxism and Form) where he draws the same conclusion as in this text, 
Ahmad infers that Jameson is situating the Third World into the 
preindustrialised mode of production. 
Another important objection Ahmad aims at Jameson’s text is a 
certain confusion between nation and collectivity. If indeed Jameson 
means collectivity (he sometimes calls it nation, sometimes collectivity, 
it is hard to know what he is really talking about, as Ahmad puts it) 
differences between the first and the third-worlds diminish and greater 
accuracy is accomplished by his proposition (15). 
Ahmad also questions Jameson’s mechanisms of canonisation, 
since the American critic describes Third World literatures simply as 
non-canonical even though they have been widely read and taught in the 
intellectual circles of the first-world. To give a counterexample to 
Jameson’s theorisation, Ahmad briefly narrates Urdu literary history, 
concluding that it has always been concerned with other issues rather 
than narrating the experience of colonialism (15). 
Ahmad at last argues that there is no unitary determination—as 
Jameson seems to defend, since he believes that the sole experience of 
colonialism defines the literatures of such varying nationalities and 
experiences. For the Indian critic what we have is, instead, a tension 
between capitalism and resistances to it and that this tension is 
characteristic of the Marxist dialectics. The unity of the world is this 
tension, but this constitutive fact does not operate in the same way 
everywhere, and literature reflects those differences, given that texts are 
always overdetermined (23). In conclusion, Ahmad accedes that totality 
is a fundamental cognitive category, but it has always to be specified 
and historicised. He then concludes with three affirmations: 1-several 
ideological conditions produce texts; 2-there is third-world in the first-
world; 3-some texts cannot be easily placed within the first, the second, 
or the third-worlds. 
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2.5 – Analysis of the debate: “lineages of the present,” 
“archaeologies of the future” 
From the outset of his text Jameson announces clearly his 
objectives, and acknowledges some of the problems that might develop 
from this initiative: “It would be presumptuous to offer some general 
theory of what is often called third-world literature, given the enormous 
variety both of national cultures in the third world and of specific 
historical trajectories in each of those areas” (68). The fact that Jameson 
thus seemed both conscious and careful with problems immanent to that 
theoretical initiative does not prevent Ahmad from arguing against 
Jameson’s totalising initiative. According to the Indian critic “[t]here are 
fundamental issues . . . which simply cannot be resolved at this level of 
generality without an altogether positivist reductionism” (4). Despite the 
undeniable pertinence of Ahmad’s critique, I would like to point out that 
some of Jameson’s generalisations do not implicate absolute reductions. 
For instance, at the conclusion of the essay, after having conceptualised 
“national allegory” and even after his much protested statement (that 
“all third-world texts... necessarily”) Jameson refers, en passant, to the 
object of his analysis as that which he has “identified as the primacy of 
national allegory in third-world culture” (84; emphasis added). This is 
an interesting choice of words, one that seems to counter his previous 
generalising (and polemic statement), since “primacy” indicates a 
preponderance, not exclusivity. Indeed if he talks in terms of “primacy” 
he is conceding that there is room for exceptions. 
One then turns back to the original statement and finds out it was 
not so generalising after all: 
All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to 
argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they 
are to be read as what I will call national 
allegories, even when, or perhaps I should say, 
particularly when their forms develop out of 
predominantly western machineries of 
representation, such as the novel. (Jameson 
Literature 69; emphasis added) 
If, as this passage suggests, there are particular instances in which we 
are to read Third World texts as national allegories, this means that, 
contrary to what Ahmad sees in Jameson’s argument, not all Third 
World texts are to be read as national allegory: 
The logic of Jameson’s own argument (i.e., that 
the third world is constituted by ‘experience of 
colonialism and imperialism’) leads necessarily to 
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the conclusion that at least some of the writers of 
the third world itself must be producing texts 
characteristic not of the so-called tribal and 
Asiatic modes but of the capitalist era as such, 
much in the manner of the so-called first world. 
But Jameson does not draw that conclusion. 
(Ahmad Rethoric 13) 
This passage also reveals that Ahmad’s concern develops from his 
disquiet at Jameson’s particular version of the Three Worlds Theory, 
which Ahmad synthesises thus: “first and second worlds are defined in 
terms of their production systems (capitalism and socialism, 
respectively), whereas the third category—the third world—is defined 
purely in terms of an ‘experience’ of externally inserted phenomena
20
” 
(6). The problem with this definition, Ahmad continues, is that it 
suspends the Third World outside history—since it is thus portrayed as a 
mere object of history—, which turns the hypothesis of the national 
allegory the only viable narrative form. In his words, “if the motivating 
force for history here is . . . the unitary "experience" of national 
oppression (if one is merely the object of history, the Hegelian slave) 
then what else can one narrate but that national oppression?” (8-9). 
I believe the greatest dissention between Jameson and Ahmad lies 
in their diverging understandings of the role the systems of production 
have in the cultural dynamics they are assessing. For one thing, 
Ahmad—denouncing Jameson’s negligence at situating the Third World 
according to its production system—hastes in uncovering Jameson’s 
definition by resorting to one of his previous texts, “Marxism and Form” 
(where Jameson draws, in quite another context, conclusions similar to 
the ones he does in this essay) to provide the definition he believes 
Jameson has overlooked. Ahmad then concludes that Jameson situates 
the Third World within the preindustrial era. Given that, according to 
Jameson, the split between the private and the public spheres is 
characteristic of the literatures of capitalist societies, Ahmad concludes 
that it is because Jameson sees the Third World as preindustrial that he 
believes Third World literatures do not present that characteristic split. 
Ahmad then argues that Jameson seems to have overlooked the fact that, 
upon colonialism, capitalism becomes “a shaping force within those 
[colonised] formations” in face of which “the separation between the 
                                                          
20 This criticism pairs with Gayatri Spivak’s argument (cf. section 3.2), since she affirms that 
the effort to construe a third way in global politics was not met with a commensurate 
intellectual effort. I mention this in order to suggest that Ahmad’s denunciation in this respect 
is part of a greater criticism to the very concept of the “Third World.” 
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public and the private, so characteristic of capitalism, has occurred there 
as well” (12-3). 
Jameson, however, did consider the matter of the production 
systems in the Third World, though reaching a quite different 
conclusion. Jameson’s thoughts at this point are indeed some of the 
most original insights of his proposition: his hypothesis is that the 
insertion of capitalism upon colonialism acts on and affects older 
structures of production—of which is consisted the life-and-death 
struggle Jameson mentions—, configuring a different split (perhaps 
something Ahmad would be readier to acknowledge in the terms of a 
“tension”) in the literatures marked by the experience of colonialism. As 
Jameson argues, “we ourselves are . . . constitutive forces powerfully at 
work on the remains of older cultures in our general world capitalist 
system” (68). Only culture offers a way out of this death struggle, only 
culture permits a narrative closure to this tension, according to Jameson. 
In his “Brief Response,” Jameson readdressed the issue raised by 
Ahmad regarding the “mode of production,” which he claimed that 
served then as a “code word” for “cultural situations.” Jameson indeed 
affirms that the basis for his comparison between countries was not the 
different modes of production but the fact that “American bankers hold 
the levels of the economy,” something he claims not to endorse, but 
recognises as a “fact of life” (27). 
It seems Jameson tends towards a cultural materialist perspective 
of the issue, he is concerned with the factuality of the phenomenon he is 
conceptualising. It does not seem to me that the debate is really putting 
in question the factual existence of the principle Jameson named 
“national allegory,” but whether or not the outcomings provided by this 
principle are desirable. Ahmad frames his critique of Jameson within 
Marxism, and what may be mainly brought into question is whether 
these outcomings are desired from a Marxist perspective. Thus, what 
seems to matter most in this debate is not the factuality of what Jameson 
terms “national allegories,” but their reality-effects—and, as a 
consequence of that, whether our efforts (as Marxists) should be 
directed at fighting to reinforce it or to undermine it. Jameson seems to 
be fighting to reinforce it (he is actually arguing, not without some 
nostalgia, that this was a value lost in the first world), whereas Ahmad 
defends these have to be undermined (narrating the Nation should not be 
the capital cultural function). The likely cause for this divergence is the 
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different paradigm each of the debaters have, for, although both are of 
Marxist inclination, each takes part of a different strand in Marxism
21
. 
One must however be alert to the fact that, in his attempt to 
conceptualise “national allegory,” Jameson does not draw a one-to-one 
correspondence between the cultural and the material: 
Our traditional conception of allegory [. . .] is that 
of an elaborate set of figures and personifications 
to be read against some one-to-one table of 
equivalences: this is, so to speak, a one-
dimensional view of this signifying process, 
which might only be set in motion and 
complexified were we willing to entertain the 
more alarming notion that such equivalences are 
themselves in constant change and transformation 
at each perpetual present of the text. (73; 
emphasis added) 
Considering this more complex understanding of allegory, Jameson’s 
non-essentialist view is ratified, since he sees this relation not as rigid 
and fixed but as a dynamic one corresponding to how the lived 
experiences of those parts of the globe conventionally described as 
Third World are. 
Besides that, it is noticeable that the idea of the mastercode is 
central in Jameson’s thought. His basic notion is that whenever one gets 
in touch with history, one does so through a narrative, since the real is 
inaccessible. As a consequence of this, all that critics and theorists can 
do is to discuss such mastercodes, something that Ahmad seems to 
ignore, since he does not accept the mastercode of the Three Worlds 
Theory adopted by Jameson. The premise of such a mastercode is that 
“it is a fact of life” that we do have central cultures and peripheral 
cultures and that, in a certain sense, peripheral cultures are defined by 
central cultures
22
. If this premise is accepted, then Jameson’s theory is 
sound and reasonable. This premise, however, is insulting to Ahmad, 
who refuses to accept it in an exemplary display of the fear of being 
defined by the Other, a fear Franco wittily termed “postcolonial 
nightmare.” The problem with the refusal to accept Jameson’s chosen 
                                                          
21 Professor Sergio Bellei points out that “Jameson has been sometimes called a post-marxist 
theorist, Ahmad believes in more orthodox forms of marxism” (e-mail exchange). In the 
discussion that followed the publication of Jacques Derridá’s Specters of Marx, it became 
progressively clear that Jameson’s relational view and project is to turn Marxism relevant 
today by turning the theory more flexible in order to adapt it to what is going on in the world 
today.  
22 The reverse is not true, Professor Bellei reminded us during the public defence of this thesis. 
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mastercode and its basic premise is that the alternative is not politically 
viable. 
Certainly, the choice for a mastercode entails not only the 
acceptance of its basic premise but also some indulgence with its 
limitations (for more on this, see section 3), and Jameson is aware of the 
limitations of the mastercode he is employing, he know that, in a sense, 
he is being reductive in defining the allegorical as the basic mode of 
literary production in the Third World, but he accepts this limitation as 
an inescapable condition to the discussion he is proposing, so much that 
he advances and refutes most of the criticism that followed. Ahmad’s 
refusal to accept Jameson’s chosen mastercode is possibly the reason 
why his “Brief Response” was indeed so brief, as indeed Jameson had 
little to respond from within the masternarrative he adopted and he 
refused to talk from another episteme, for reasons that he had also 
previously laid out. 
Both Jameson and Ahmad are Marxist critics, both contend that 
final determinations are the outcome of multiple constitutive facts, yet 
each maintain a different focus: whereas Ahmad believes that any 
generalisation of the sort proposed by Jameson must first inquire on the 
ideological conditions that produce texts, Jameson is more concerned 
with what he terms “situational consciousness,” that is, the material 
experience that is narrated by such texts, which, he believes, provides a 
possibility of “grasping the social totality” (85). For Ahmad, any 
attempt at understanding the present and its material contingencies and 
cultural configurations must take into account the historical 
developments that shaped them. Jameson, on his turn, seems to be 
historicising future by attentively looking at the present: for him, the 
present-day construction and envisionment of the future is telling of the 
present-day consciousness and material situation. The way we, now, 
devise our future is telling of ourselves, of our material situation and 
consciousness. In other words, Ahmad offers a genealogy of the present; 
Jameson, an archaeology of the future. 
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3 – CHAPTER III: 
“National Allegory” from a cultural realist perspective 
 
The distinction between Jameson’s and Ahmad’s projects may be 
fruitfully problematized at yet another level, since it is possible to 
appropriate Jameson’s argument for a critique of privilege, as I hope to 
show. In this chapter I seek to expand the debate through the 
contribution of other critics and through the investigation of the 
polysemic potential of the concept of “national allegory” as it was taken 
on throughout the debate and its resonances. Such investigation will, 
hopefully, foreground an enriching new possible reading of Jameson’s 
argument, a reading that sees it as a sort of complicitous critique
23
, or, as 
Jameson might have it, as a metacritical stance. The foregrounding of 
this novel way of reading Jameson’s argument is expected to contribute 
to the discussion by opening it up, rather than resolving it. The 
discussion on the postmodernity in Latin America is quite instrumental 
in this respect and will constitute a relevant section of this chapter. 
Confronting Jameson’s place of enunciation—that of a First 
World intellectual, speaking to a First World learned audience regarding 
university education in the US—with his acknowledgement that he does 
not 
see how a first-world intellectual can avoid [the 
operation of the strategy of otherness] without 
falling back into some general liberal and 
humanistic universalism: it seems to me that one 
of our basic political tasks lies precisely in the 
ceaseless effort to remind the American public of 
the radical difference of other national situations. 
(Literature 77) 
one can conclude that, as this passage evinces, Jameson is doubtlessly 
concerned with the position and the role of the First World intellectual. 
He is, definitely, concerned with his own position and political task as 
                                                          
23 While there is a number of other theoretical concepts that translate similarly the attitude I am 
describing here—such as Jacques Derridá’s “inhabiting the structures,” Judith Butler’s 
“contingent foundations,” and Gayatri Spivak’s “strategic essentialism”—as well as there is 
consistent and pertinent criticism to it—such as Audre Lorde’s declaration that “the master’s 
tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” and Linda Alcoff’s contention that “a claim can 
only be taken seriously—and thus have its strategic effects—when it is taken as truth in a real 
and not merely strategic sense” (Politics, 323)—I will be working with the concept of 
“complicitous critique,” by Linda Hutcheon, and Jameson’s “metacriticim” because of their 
specific concern with the possibilities of political engagement within postmodernism. 
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he advances his theory, and he is, arguably, implicating himself in his 
own criticism. In face of this conclusion, one is led to investigate in 
what possible ways may Jameson be implicating himself in his own 
criticism, that is, it becomes imperative to investigate whether 
Jameson’s argument can be productively read as one that criticises 
metaconstructions—such as “the Third World—” from the inside 
instead of as one that endorses them. 
As I have already argued (cf. section 2.2), Jameson seems to 
operate on two contrasting methods in a sort of intellectual hybridism: 
he both criticises orientalism and performs it, he both affirms the need 
for a historicist approach yet leaves it aside. Surely, this procedure is far 
from what he had elsewhere characterised as pastiche. His is a posture 
closer to what Linda Hutcheon’s termed “complicitous critique,” one 
“whose mode is resolutely contradictory as well as unavoidably 
political” (Politics 1), since he “speak[s] to a society from within the 
values and history of that society, while still questioning it” (Politics 
12). When Jameson coins the expression “national allegory” he operates 
a number of master narratives (the Third World, the nation), yet his 
statements carry strong potential commitment to criticise these master 
narratives from within. According to Caroline Roberto, “Hutcheon 
endorses that complicitous critique is the feature that makes postmodern 
art filled with political outcomes, thus leading to a reflexivity that 
challenges Jameson’s critique [of postmodern hybridisation as 
politically void pastiche]” (Debate 27). Jameson is certainly complying 
with macroconstructs while potentially critical of their limitations, in a 
truly politicised gesture. 
We can see in Jameson the same ethics and motivation that, 
according to Hutcheon, characterises both feminism and 
postmodernism: “Both try to avoid the bad faith of believing they can 
stand outside ideology, but both want to reclaim their right to contest 
the power of a dominant one, even if from a compromised position” 
(Politics 23; emphasis added.). Indeed that is what comes out when 
Jameson outlines the political spirit of the analysis he puts forth in his 
previous article on Postmodernism (which, as we have already 
discussed, constituted the basis of his article on Third World literature 
which initiated the debate here studied): “If we do not achieve some 
general sense of a cultural dominant, then we fall back into a view of 
present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence 
of a host of distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable” 
(Postmodernism 57). Also, this concern appears also when Jameson 
affirms “I don't see how a first-world intellectual can avoid this 
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operation [of differentiation] without falling back into some general 
liberal and humanistic universalism” (Literature 77). 
According to Hutcheon, postmodern theory is “reluctant to isolate 
a single major determining factor” (Creed apud Hutcheon Politics 153) 
because it cannot do that “without falling into the trap of which it 
implicitly accuses other ideologies: that of totalization” (Politics 153). 
But that operation is typical of the postmodern subject. Indeed, as 
Roberto puts it, “[t]he importance of representation in postmodern 
cultural production is associated with its ability to bring forth the 
political constructs imbued in representation itself” (Debate 22). Such 
seemingly contradictory initiative sets the inevitable operation of the 
postmodern subject, and this is no different for the postmodern 
intellectual, as both theory and criticism are cultural products. It is this 
sort of intellectual initiative that we see in Jameson, an initiative that 
follows Hutcheon’s contention that “the postmodern does not deny its 
inevitable implication in [master narratives], but it also wants to use that 
‘insider’ position to ‘de-doxify’ the ‘givens’ that ‘go without saying’ in 
those grand systems. Thus, it is neither neoconservatively nostalgic nor 
radically revolutionary; it is unavoidably compromised – and it knows 
it” (Politics 119). 
As a consequence of the contingent limitation imposed by the 
acknowledgement of the imprisionment within language—and, 
consequently, within ideology—“postmodernism is politically 
ambivalent for it is doubly coded – both complicitous with and 
contesting of the cultural dominants within which it operates” 
(Hutcheon Politics 142). As Hutcheon further develops, “[c]omplicity is 
perhaps necessary (or at least unavoidable) in deconstructive critique 
(you have to signal – and thereby install – that which you want to 
subvert), though it also inevitably conditions both the radicality of the 
kind of critique it can offer and the possibility of suggestive change” 
(Politics 152). As a result of that, “[t]he political confusion surrounding 
postmodernism is . . . a direct result of its double encoding as both 
complicity and critique” (Politics 153-4). To some critics, however, the 
announcement of this commitment to criticism from the inside does not 
excuse the premises on which they are based, and this is possibly what 
inspires Ahmad to accuse Jameson of concealing his own ideology or of 
lacking methodological consistence. 
 
3.1 – Metacommentary and the creation of the conditions of 
criticism 
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Jameson had by then developed a theory of the 
metacommentary
24
, a method “according to which our object of study is 
less the text itself than the interpretations through which we attempt to 
confront and to appropriate it.” In this context, the author continues, 
“[i]nterpretation is here construed as an essentially allegorical act, which 
consists in rewriting a given text in terms of a particular interpretive 
master code.” (Unconscious, 9-10). Therefore, allegory is a method of 
interpretation, one that speaks more of the interpreting subject and its 
context than of the text itself. 
Yet, if Jameson’s formulation suggests that Third World texts—
instead of being ontologically constituted as allegorical of their 
nations—are rather seen and read as so by the First World reader, then 
how can Third World literature redeem the First World intellectual, as 
Jameson seems to be suggesting? One possible way of looking at this 
problematic is, considering that Jameson, as does Spivak, defend the 
pedagogical and didactic functions of art (Postmodernism 89), take his 
argument as a suggestion that First World intellectuals can learn 
something about themselves through the way they approach Third 
World texts. As a matter of fact, the exercise of thinking about 
interpretation teaches us something about the situation of interpretation, 
as Jameson has affirmed elsewhere: 
All thinking about interpretation must sink itself 
in the strangeness, the unnaturalness, of the 
hermeneutic situation; or to put it another way, 
every individual interpretation must include an 
interpretation of its own existence, must show its 
own credentials and justify itself: every 
commentary must be at the same time a 
metacommentary. (Jameson Metacommentary 10) 
In other words, a reflection on the hermeneutic situation must 
necessarily entail a reflection on the interpreting subject. In face of this, 
it is no surprise that, in order to provide the basis for a reflection on the 
task of the First World intellectual and call for a strengthening of its 
political valence, Jameson suggests looking not at Third World texts 
themselves, but to the way they have been read by the First World. The 
suggestion that is foregrounded by this reading is that it is possible to 
learn, from the way they approach Third World texts, to make their own 
texts strange to themselves, learning to read them politically too. 
                                                          
24 See Marxism and Form, The Political Unconscious, and “Metacommentary.” 
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For the viability of such a project, it is worth investigating how 
the Third World and its literature come to be seen as they are, after all, 
this possible reading of Jameson’s argument is only pertinent in case 
this strangeness can be achieved to a certain level in relation to home 
literature. Gramsci, when discussing ideology, affirms that one cannot 
see what one is not predisposed to see. Identity is then a category that 
develops from this need, since the contact with something one was not 
predisposed to see causes a puzzle moment which is resolved through a 
radical reduction to identity or non-identity
25
. This is how the First 
World is ready to accept and receive Third World cultural production: it 
is either a faithful representation of what I already see as the Third 
World and it is thus readily accepted as its representative
26
, or it is 
something I cannot identify and therefore deny. This is what causes 
Ahmad’s conclusion that “one is not quite sure whether one is dealing 
with a fallacy ("all third-world texts are" this or that) or with the Law of 
the Father (you must write this if you are to be admitted into my 
theory)” (Rethoric 12).  
The relation between the universalist assumption and the 
particular is well illustrated by the fact that authors who counter 
Jameson’s proposition, such as Franco and Prasad (as well as Ahmad) 
have exemplified with the literatures they study to counter Jameson’s 
generalizations (cf. section 1.2). If authors who are ready to reassess the 
concept of “national allegory” are more inclined to accepting Jameson’s 
propositions, the authors who counter Jameson tend to speak from the 
particular, thus missing the point of Jameson’s proposition altogether: to 
offer a mapping possibility where the particular can trace its place in the 
global cultural politics. As I have mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, this research focuses on a specific potential meaning in 
Jameson’s argument that may problematize universalist discourse from 
within it. 
Foregrounding a reading of Jameson through a metacritical lens 
approximates the debate to the discussion on postmodernism in Latin 
America
27
, since both projects employ a strategic use of 
macroconstructs, that is, both projects entail the confrontation with the 
reality effects of discourses. Here is how the perspective of cultural 
                                                          
25 The puzzle moment may generate wonder or fear—awe and the sublime. 
26 Also, here is the allegorical sense, it represents what I-the West-expect to see represented as 
the East, according to Brian Larkin. 
27 Such a discussion is concerned rather with the matter of temporality than with the matter of 
depth. Interestingly, the connection is even more clear if one considers the fact that Jameson 
describes the perception of Third World texts by a First World audience as “old.” 
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realism (cf. section1.4) is important in this analysis. Also, here is the 
limitation that tensions such perspectives, after all, “strategic 
essentialism” tends to reinforce essentialist discourses. 
 
3.2 – Expanding the debate 
Since the discussion on postmodernism in Latin-America has 
taken on the perspective of cultural materialism in the terms proposed in 
this research, it proficuously stages the Jameson/Ahmad debate, as I 
intend to show below. That discussion deals with the paradox of a Latin-
America that simultaneously inhabits the postmodern and the belated 
time—postmodern from our own Latin-American episteme because of 
the simultaneous presence of old and new structures, and belated from 
the First World episteme—providing a new perspective on the 
Jameson/Ahmad debate. 
I have so far dealt with two possible dynamics of the mechanism 
Jameson named “national allegory:” an ontological one, according to 
which the concept would describe characteristics which are immanent 
and proper to the Third World text, a view that has motivated most of 
the (earlier) criticism to Jameson’s proposition; and a hermeneutical 
one, proposing that Third World literature is not allegorical in itself but 
is rather read as so by the First World reader. I propose now a reading of 
the Jameson/Ahmad debate from a Latin-American postmodern 
perspective, where a third dynamic, which I will term metacritical, 
flourishes. Under that dynamic, “national allegory” is strategically used 
in an ongoing discourse by intellectuals occupying the “Third World” 
position as a means of criticising the collective project of nation in, as I 
will argue here, a quite postmodern fashion. Also under that dynamic, 
“national allegory” is used by Jameson as a metacritical tool in order to 
implicate himself—and, by extension, the First World intellectual—in 
his criticism. 
Jean Franco, commenting on Latin American Postmodernity, 
affirms that  
In such novels, it is precisely the disappearance of 
the nation, its failure to provide systems of 
meaning and belief, that undermines referential 
reading. It is true that they capture the continued 
resonance of certain historical events, such as the 
conquest and the impact of succeeding waves of 
modernisation, visible in the fragmented life-
forms they have left in their wake. For this 
untimeliness is the condition of Latin American 
modernity, giving one a sense of reliving the past. 
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Or it is as if the past can speak in the present tense 
. . . . The juxtaposition of disparate discourses and 
the use of pastiche perhaps help explain why U.S. 
critics so eagerly embrace Latin American novels 
as postmodern. But incorporation into 
postmodernism is no more satisfactory than being 
labelled with Jameson’s notion of Third World 
national allegory. Indeed, the two recuperative 
gestures seem to be motivated by the same 
operation of extrapolation. Extrapolation reduces 
the complexity of intertextual allusions and 
deprives texts of their own historical relations to 
prior texts. It implies a view of Latin American 
literature either in opposition to the metropolis or 
as part of the metropolis’s postmodern repertoire 
(208-9). 
According to Franco, therefore, the hybridisation of genres, the use of 
intertextuality, the sense of loss of the signified, the use of pastiche, and 
a sum of other characteristics make Latin American texts seem 
“postmodern,” but she defends that “just as national allegory fails to 
describe adequately the simultaneous dissolution of the idea of the 
nation and the continuous persistence of national concerns, so 
postmodernism cannot adequately describe those texts that use pastiche 
and citation not simply as style but as correlatives of the continent’s 
uneasy and unfinished relationship to modernity” (211). 
Spivak also joins in the debate. In the chapter “Collectivities” of 
the book Death of a Discipline, she discusses the impact of cultural 
studies in higher education, proposing a reassessment and restructuring 
of this field in face of the new scenario created by the presence of liberal 
multiculturalism in comparative studies. She seems to share of 
Jameson’s concern
28
, yet leading to a quite different programme
29
: that 
“we must, as literature teachers in the classroom, . . . let literature teach 
us that there are no certainties, that the process is open, and that it may 
be altogether salutary that it is so”  (26). 
                                                          
28“If we do not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then we fall back into a 
view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host of 
distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable” (Jameson, Postmodernism 57). 
29 Different because Jameson calls for a totality model on the assumption that some level of 
certainty is an epistemological necessity, whether Spivak defends undecidability as a value 
“Insofar as Comparative Literature remains part of the Euro–U.S. cultural dominant, it shares 
another sort of fear, the fear of undecidability in the subject of humanism” (26). 
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According to Spivak, collectivity is the basis of both culture and 
politics, yet it is extremely fragile due to the law of social curvature
30
. 
However, the irreducibility of the social curvature means, she argues, 
that it is within the field of the undecidable that politics must take place 
(27-30). Literature works on that field, as Spivak suggests based on her 
creative employment of the derridean notion of teleopoisesis
31
 in 
reading Virginia Woolf’s “A Room of One’s Own.” Spivak defends that 
peripheral literatures ask for such a (transgressive) reading—considering 
that “[t]he reader and writer are multiple in constituting the unverifiable 
truth of the text” (42)—and exemplifies this reading by analysing two 
novels that dialogue with Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness.” According to 
her, reading literature as teleopoiesis is an alternative that counters the 
“mechanical convenience of mapmaking
32
” (31). Spivak’s reading 
model seems to counter Jameson’s concept of “national allegory,” since 
that concept “is clearly a form of just such mapping of the totality” 
(Jameson, Literature 88). 
What Spivak points out as the advantage of the contact with 
multicultural texts—that is, an imaginative and creative, meaningful 
contact with the other—is the lack of which Jameson is diagnosing in 
the First World reception of Third World texts, and in First World 
literature as a self-referential means (that is, metacriticism). What 
Ahmad sees as Jameson’s endorsement of macroconstructs can actually 
be read as Jameson’s pointing to how unimaginative First World 
writings and readings—and thus, how uncreative and therefore 
politically void—have been, and how urgent and imperative it is to face 
and overcome such problem. 
It is necessary to point that Spivak, as well as Jameson, 
understands generality as a necessary epistemological means. But not 
any type of generality, as she distinguishes 
two kinds of generalities. The generality of poiesis 
depends on its unverifiability; it cannot be tied to 
a singular ‘fact.’ There is another kind of 
generality, which must suppress singularity in 
order to establish a ‘fact.’ It is, if you like, the 
difference between prefiguration and prediction. 
(44) 
                                                          
30 In Spivak’s words, “that one cannot access another directly and with a guarantee” (30). 
31 “[T]o affect the distant in a poiesis—an imaginative making—without guarantees, and thus, 
by definitive predication, reverse its value” (31). 
32 In the first chapter of that same volume Spivak suggests “a philosophy of planning . . . [that] 
discourages mapmaking literary criticism as an end in itself because diagnostic cartography 
does not keep the door open to the “to come” (6). 
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It is, therefore, in the possibility of imagining an otherwise 
unpredictable futurity project that lays the distinction between the 
Spivak’s derridean teleopoiesis and Jameson’s “national allegory.” 
Besides that, Spivak’s proposition at a generality entails a 
rather different concern from the “old particularism-universalism 
debate—” one of the axes that polarise the Jameson/Ahmad debate—as 
it implies the pragmatic need for a certain level of generality, as a 
possibility of abstraction
33
, suggesting that “[w]e cannot and should not 
reject this impulse toward generalization,” keeping it, however, “under 
erasure, visible as a warning” (46). This implicit criticism to Jameson’s 
mapmaking proposition does not mean she pairs with Ahmad, as she 
criticises the two theorists for attending to identitarian perspectives (and 
being thus tied to singular facts): 
Politically correct metropolitan multiculturalists 
want the world’s others to be identitarians; 
nationalist (Jameson) or class (Ahmad). To undo 
this binary demand is to suggest that peripheral 
literature may stage more surprising and 
unexpected maneuvers toward collectivity. (55-
56) 
The nodal point of Spivak’s intervention in the Jameson/Ahmad debate 
is, therefore, a criticism at a sort of identitarianism that ignores the law 
of curvature and does not envisage a more imaginative possibility of 
reading. 
Spivak resorts to “Chinua Achebe’s famous comment on Heart of 
Darkness: ‘It is not the differentness that worries Conrad but the lurking 
hint of kinship, of common ancestry’” to introduce the issue of the 
uncanny in relation to the Other’s text (57). That is particularly relevant 
to the novel she is analysing—Season of Migration to the North—for, as 
she argues that, in that particular case, “colonialism” is the element that 
is introduced in the familiar making it uncanny:  
As the novel unfolds, we know that the name of 
what comes forth to transform this familiar shared 
humanity of that strange and unfamiliar country 
called England into a source of fear and anxiety 
(Angst) may be something called “colonialism.” 
We hark back to the passage by Achebe. (58) 
Spivak is however quite careful not to suggest that any particular 
case accounts for all cases. When proceeding with her reading of the 
                                                          
33 Spivak argues in favour of gender as a category that allows such a possibility of abstraction, 
due to the “global commensurability in the field of gender” (46). 
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two novels, Spivak often notes, whenever she interprets a particular 
aspect of the narrative, that she is not discussing “characterization or 
cultural information
34
” (61). This is clearly a criticism to both Jameson 
and Ahmad, for “Jameson was generalizing from China, as his chief 
critic, Aijaz Ahmad, was arguing from a species of muscular Marxism, 
which automatically substitutes class for nationality” (66). Her 
suggestion is that “[f]or the kind of institutional literary pedagogy I am 
envisaging, do not accuse—do not excuse—turn around through reading 
and use remains the imperative” (65). 
In short, then, the basis of Spivak’s criticism to both Jameson and 
Ahmad is the sort of generality each of them employs, Jameson’s 
nationalism and Ahmad’s class, both presenting an identitarian 
perspective based on certain particulars, constituting what Spivak terms 
“performative examples of an unexamined politics of culture” (28), 
limited to building predictions rather than imaginative prefigurations 
that call for transgressive readings.  
Spivak, however, seems to have missed the polysemic potential 
of Jameson's concept of “national allegory,” even though Spivak herself 
seems to employ a similar method to describe the periphery of the world 
as “the Global South.” The entire debate seems to be articulated in an 
opposition of projects analogous to the opposition of projects of cultural 
materialism in comparison to intersectionality: cultural materialism is 
concerned with the interpellation of the subject by the macroconstructs, 
it understands categories as non-essential, but as causing real effects 
since they interpellate subjects; whereas intersectionality is concerned 
with the deconstruction of discourses of homogenisation. 
Allegory, for Jameson, “is not a one-to-one mapping of a series 
of equivalences, but ‘profoundly discontinuous’ and ‘a matter of breaks 
and heterogeneities, of the multiple polysemia of the dream rather than 
the homogeneous representation of the symbol” (Literature, 73). 
Jameson’s “method of reading provides a framework for accounting for 
the complex interplay between the psychological, the economic and the 
political, and the cultural” (McGonegal, “Metacritique”, 256).  
Jameson’s general project is best delineated in his “Foreword” to 
Roberto Fernández Retamar’s Caliban: 
We . . . need a new literary and cultural 
internationalism which involves risks and dangers, 
                                                          
34 Other instances are: “I am not making a characterological point”(58); and “The narrator is 
not indexed as representative of a “Third World” collectivity of culture (Jameson) or class 
(Ahmad)” (63). 
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which calls us into question fully as much as it 
acknowledges the Other, thereby serving as a 
more adequate and chastening form of self-
knowledge. This “internationalism of the national 
situations" neither reduces the “Third World” to 
some homogeneous Other of the West, nor does it 
vacuously celebrate the “astonishing” pluralism of 
human cultures: rather, by isolating the common 
situation (capitalism, imperialism, colonialism) 
shared by very different kinds of societies, it 
allows their differences to be measured against 
each other as well as against ourselves. (xi-xii) 
I have mentioned (cf. section 2.2) the issue with the hybrid 
method Jameson adopts in his article: the method used in the 
preliminary part of his article is orientalism (Ahmad names it a “rhetoric 
of otherness”), but this is just to show how the Other of the First 
World—that is, the Third World—is built (or rather discursively 
materialised). It is this construction that bases the perception (inherent to 
Mr Bennet’s misgivings) of Third World literatures as old-fashioned. 
Jameson indulges his own employment of the rhetoric of otherness, in 
the initial stages of his reasoning, as a means of exposing the discursive 
materialization of the Third World and its literature for a Frist World 
public which results in a perception of such literatures as old-fashioned 
and outmoded. In the ensuing part of the essay, Jameson is already 
historicising and thereby underdoing that perception. Ahmad’s 
misgivings towards Jameson’s essay have much to do with that first 
step: he does not follow Jameson in the ensuing step. For Ahmad, the 
employment of a rhetoric of otherness invalidates the entire attempt, 
something he can only do because he does consider Jameson’s self-
critical initiative. 
                                                                                                                      53 
4 – CHAPTER IV: FINAL REMARKS 
As I tried to show in this research, the Jameson/Ahmad debate 
must be read from a cultural realist perspective because such perspective 
provides meaningful and enriching readings of the debate. The basis of 
the debate, the old universalism versus particularism conflict, is still on, 
acquiring, however, new contours, new shades and lights as Cultural 
Studies and multiculturalism spread and breed roots in Universities and 
cultures around the globe, in what is perhaps a (positive) (side) effect of 
the postmodernism Jameson described as a cultural dominant. 
The debate has inspired strong reactions, having constituted a 
background against which the field of Postcolonial Studies was 
developed. Yet, after that initial stage when Jameson’s text served as a 
kind of scapegoat against which the discipline developed, a growing 
tendency to reassess and ressignify its fundamental concept—that of 
Third World’s “national allegory”—provided the conditions for the 
existence of this research, which aims at pushing the debate a little 
further in that direction, suggesting that the debate may stage even more 
insightful and provoking endeavours if we are to overcome the 
usefulness of a scapegoat and read Jameson as a metacritical text, even 
though he speaks from an ineluctably complicit and compromised 
position. 
Indeed one could ask whether there is—or whether there has ever 
been—an alternative to that kind of speech that implicates itself in the 
criticism it advances. The alternative could perhaps be the naivety or 
bad faith of trusting one can speak from nowhere, that one can abandon 
their place of enunciation. What is the ethical limit—and what is the 
ethical imperative—for the problematic yet necessary initiative of being 
critical of the very conceptions one speaks from? I believe it is a 
necessary radicalism, a first step towards the criticism of one’s own 
privilege, or, as Jameson puts it, “every individual interpretation must 
include an interpretation of its own existence, must show its own 
credentials and justify itself: every commentary must be at the same 
time a metacommentary.” 
Jameson has been developing his theory of the need for the 
hermeneutic initiative to be preceded by the questioning of one’s self, of 
the one who is doing the interpreting. In Postmodernism, Jameson 
described the historical moment of postmodernism as a cultural 
dominant, leaving to his later article—“Third World Literature”—the 
task of analysing the consequences brought by such cultural dominant 
everywhere: in the First World, the idealism of the Master; in the Third 
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World, the materialism of the slave. His particular twist of the Hegelian 
dialectics is provided by the recommendation that the First World 
should abandon that idealism by a recovery of what was lost when the 
bourgeoise monad ego became the supreme being of postmodern culture 
and politics, a recovery of a sense of reference and of belonging, which 
is to be reached by means of a cognitive mapping that allows our 
differences to be measured against each other (Brief Response). 
This is why I defend that reading Jameson’s propositions as 
endorsing metaconstructs is to too quickly do away with the possibility 
of engaging with the criticism to one’s own privilege. Read from a 
cultural realist perspective, Jameson’s text speaks of material 
differences that actually exist in the world and that interpellate 
individuals and collectivities in ways that generate real effects, such as 
the selection of Third World texts to circulate in the First World, a 
selection that is carried out by publishing houses in the First World, as 
Ahmad pointed out. 
The gist of the Jameson/Ahmad debate is the old 
universalism/particularism debate, where, on the one hand, the need to 
develop a theory that can to some extent situate the relative position of 
the individual within that which surpasses them—be it a collectivity, be 
it the Nation—effectively allowing politics to take place sacrifices the 
singularity of the particular; and on the other hand, the need to consider 
the overdetermined position of the particular sacrifices the possibilities 
of thinking and doing politics. Each of these positions has both 
limitations and reaches, each implying a different ethics and motivation. 
It is a matter of choice, a choice that is taken on political and ethical 
grounds, after all, whereas the universalist claim can be attacked on an 
ethical level on the grounds that it obliterates its ideologies, and on a 
political level on the grounds that it is an epistemologically frail 
position, the particularist claim can also be attacked on an ethical level 
on the grounds that it neglects the real effects of macroconstructs, and 
on a political level on the grounds that it provides no framework for 
taking a political stance. 
The discoursive history of the debate—how it has been read—has 
developed from a strong initial resistance which interpreted Jameson’s 
concepts as rigid structures that endorsed the macroconstructs he was 
operating—the Nation, the Third World, national allegory—
progressively towards responses that, by opening up for the potential 
polysemy of these concepts, allowed for new readings that provide 
meaningful contributions to the debate. As well as these early 
responses—articulated mainly in the lines of Ahmad’s arguments—
                                                                                                                      55 
contributed greatly for the development of Postcolonial Studies, indeed 
setting its grounds as argued by Szeman, the later, more recent 
responses can set the grounds for a new take on the greater field of 
Cultural Studies, a new take that considers the fact of life that 
macroconstructs, however arbitrary they are, indeed interpellate 
individuals and collectivities. In other words, macroconstructs generate 
real effects. Anyone engaged with the pressing need for thinking and 
doing politics today must consider that fact, or risk falling into the 
pitfalls of postmodernism, as argued by Alcoff and Mohanty. 
The debate has been running for twenty-seven years, and, as I 
hope to have shown in the research, it will keep on running because the 
old universalism/particularism debate has been recently influenced by 
new perspectives coming from cultural studies. It is thus necessary to 
keep reading the debate because it is a new debate today, since it has 
materialised the terms it deployed, continually shifting its signifieds, 
what makes it necessary to keep looking at the debate from new, 
emerging perspectives. This research aimed at moving the debate a step 
forward in the direction of the most recent responses to it. 
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